Consequence, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and the Fourth Amendment\u27s  No-Win  Scenario by Glick, Scott J
Indiana Law Journal
Volume 90 | Issue 1 Article 1
Winter 2015
Consequence, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and
the Fourth Amendment's "No-Win" Scenario
Scott J. Glick
Maurice A. Deane School of Law at Hofstra University, Scott.J.Glick@hofstra.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj
Part of the Fourth Amendment Commons, Military, War, and Peace Commons, and the National
Security Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School
Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Indiana Law Journal by an authorized administrator of Digital
Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
wattn@indiana.edu.
Recommended Citation
Glick, Scott J. (2015) "Consequence, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and the Fourth Amendment's "No-Win" Scenario," Indiana Law
Journal: Vol. 90: Iss. 1, Article 1.
Available at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol90/iss1/1
Consequence, Weapons of Mass Destruction,  
and the Fourth Amendment’s “No-Win” Scenario 
SCOTT J. GLICK* 
INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................... 1 
I. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT ..................................................................................... 6 
A. PRINCIPLES AND RULES ............................................................................... 6 
B. EXCEPTIONS ............................................................................................... 11 
II. WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION ...................................................................... 26 
A. CHEMICAL WEAPONS ................................................................................. 27 
B. BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS .............................................................................. 29 
C. RADIOLOGICAL WEAPONS ......................................................................... 31 
D. NUCLEAR WEAPONS .................................................................................. 32 
III. DEFINITIONAL ISSUES ......................................................................................... 34 
IV. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT’S PROTECTIVE LENS AND THE 
PROBABILITY CONSEQUENCE MATRIX .................................................................... 36 
V. A PATH FORWARD ............................................................................................... 40 
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................ 44 
“Today, there is no greater threat to the American people than weapons of 
mass destruction . . . .”    – President Barack Obama (2010) 
INTRODUCTION 
What is the role that consequence should play in a Fourth Amendment analysis? 
Should our view of reasonableness be affected by the nature of the consequence 
that the government seeks to prevent, such as stopping a terrorist from using a 
weapon of mass destruction (WMD)? While some may consider the use of a WMD 
by a terrorist to be a plot for an action movie, since the September 11, 2001, 
attacks, there have been increasing indications that malicious actors or 
organizations are attempting to obtain a WMD in order to cause massive 
devastation or catastrophic loss of life.1 Clearly, this risk did not exist at the time 
                                                                                                                 
 
 † Copyright © 2015 Scott J. Glick. 
 * Senior Counsel, National Security Division, U.S. Department of Justice, and Visiting 
Assistant Professor of Law, Maurice A. Deane School of Law at Hofstra University. This 
Article has been reviewed for publication by the Justice Department in accordance with 28 
C.F.R. § 17.18. The views expressed in this Article are solely those of the author and do not 
necessarily reflect the views of the Justice Department. The author wishes to thank Matthew 
Waxman, Stephen Dycus, Joshua Geltzer, and Jordan Strauss, as well as the faculty of Hofstra 
Law for their review and comments on an earlier draft of this Article. The author also wishes to 
thank Erica Newland, J.D. Yale 2015, for her outstanding research and insightful comments. 
 1. See ROLF MOWATT-LARSSEN, HARVARD KENNEDY SCHOOL BELFER CENTER FOR 
SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, AL QAEDA WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION 
THREAT: HYPE OR REALITY? 5–6 (2012), available at http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu
/files/al-qaeda-wmd-threat.pdf (discussing “Al Qaeda’s patient, decade-long effort to steal or 
construct an improvised nuclear device” and its “perception of the benefits of producing the 
image of a mushroom cloud rising over a U.S. city, just as the 9/11 attacks have altered the 
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the Constitution was adopted.2 Indeed, one expert has warned that at “no time in 
human history has there been the ability for a cabal of hateful fanatics, unfettered 
from the constraints of a state, to destroy cities or kill hundreds of thousands in a 
single cataclysmic act.”3 
Aside from advancements in technology that may enable the government to 
deploy a comprehensive system of WMD sensors in the future,4 one of the most 
effective methods that the government could employ to locate a suspected terrorist 
who intended to use a WMD in an American city would be to monitor the 
terrorist’s communications. There are two different statutory regimes that regulate 
the government’s ability to obtain the content of communications in the United 
States—the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA)5 and Title III of 
the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (Title III).6 To be sure, if 
the government is able to establish probable cause with respect to a particular 
telephone or e-mail account that is being used by a terrorist (and is able to meet the 
other requirements of FISA or Title III), then the government can obtain a lawful 
wiretap7 to monitor the content8 of the communications. Indeed, it is well settled 
                                                                                                                 
course of history”); Federal Bureau of Investigation, Weapons of Mass Destruction: 
Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/terrorism/wmd/wmd
_faqs (noting that there are indicators of increasing WMD threats since the 9/11 attacks); see 
also STEVE BOWMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31332, WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION: 
THE TERRORIST THREAT (2002) (“The continuing possibility of terrorist attacks using nuclear, 
biological, or chemical weapons is an ongoing concern in the national security policy arena in 
the face of a clear trend among terrorists to inflict greater numbers of casualties.”). 
 2. While cannons pulled by horses or loaded on ships may have posed the greatest threat 
to colonists, some historians have found circumstantial evidence that British troops sought to 
use naturally occurring incidents of small pox as biological weapons during the colonial period 
both prior to and during the American Revolution. See Elizabeth A. Fenn, Biological Warfare 
in Eighteenth-Century North America: Beyond Jeffery Amherst, 86 J. AM. HIST. 1522, 156570 
(2000); Harold B. Gill, Jr., Colonial Germ Warfare, COLONIAL WILLIAMSBURG J. (Spring 
2004), http://www.history.org/Foundation/journal/Spring04/warfare.cfm. 
 3. See Nuclear Terrorism: Assessing the Threat to the Homeland: Hearing Before the S. 
Comm. on Homeland Sec. and Governmental Affairs, 110th Cong. 405 (2008) [hereinafter 
Nuclear Terrorism Hearing] (statement of Gary Anthony Ackerman, Research Director, National 
Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, University of Maryland). 
 4. See U.S. Researchers Unveil New WMD Sensors, GLOBAL SECURITY NEWSWIRE 
(Apr. 3, 2006), http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/us-researchers-unveil-new-wmd-sensors (“The 
Argonne National Laboratory in Illinois has developed new sensors for remote detection of 
WMD materials . . . .”). The application of the Fourth Amendment to the use of such sensors 
in public or private spaces is beyond the scope of this Article. Cf. Kyllo v. United States, 533 
U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (discussing the use of a device that “explore[s] details of the home that 
would previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion”). 
 5. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1811 (2012). 
 6. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2520 (2012). 
 7. This Article uses the term “wiretap” to generically describe the monitoring, interception, 
or recording of the contents of telephone or e-mail communications in circumstances in which a 
person has a reasonable expectation of privacy. However, it should be noted that “electronic 
surveillance” is a term of art that is specifically defined in FISA. See 50 U.S.C. § 1801(f) (2012). 
Whether specific forms of monitoring, interception, or recording constitute electronic 
surveillance within the meaning of FISA is beyond the scope of this Article. 
 8. Other tools in FISA and Title 18 permit the government to obtain noncontent 
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that where the government has individualized suspicion in regard to a particular 
communication device and meets the statutory requirements of FISA or Title III, 
court-authorized wiretaps are constitutional.9 
However, let us assume that a reliable informant, who has an established track 
record and inside access to a terrorist group, reports that a highly skilled member of 
that terrorist group has entered the United States and intends to assemble a WMD 
in a major metropolitan city on the East Coast sometime within the next thirty to 
forty-five days. To add additional context, let us further assume that the informant 
is 80 percent certain that the terrorist is assembling the WMD in a safe house 
somewhere in Georgetown, a historic neighborhood located approximately two 
miles from the White House. If the informant does not know the precise location or 
the specific telephone or e-mail account that the terrorist is using to communicate 
with other coconspirators, how should a federal court resolve the constitutional 
tension that would arise if the government sought an order permitting it to target an 
indeterminate number of communication devices? If the nation was not at war,10 
would a federal court under the circumstances of this hypothetical be faced with 
what some may call the Fourth Amendment’s “no-win” scenario? Would the court 
face the choice of either issuing an unconstitutional order that allows the 
government to wiretap every communication device being used in Georgetown 
(because that is the only way to find the terrorist and prevent the use of the WMD) 
or refusing to issue the order because the Fourth Amendment11 tolerates no other 
result, which could lead to massive destruction or catastrophic loss of life? 
The WMD scenario enables us to explore what may very well be some of the 
most challenging constitutional questions of our time. First, should consequence—
that is, the nature and gravity of harm the government seeks to prevent—ever play 
an outcome-determinative role in a Fourth Amendment analysis? Equally 
important: who should decide whether consequence has a role to play? And finally, 
how can government officials, who are responsible for protecting the nation from 
terrorists seeking to cause a catastrophic consequence, obtain greater ex ante 
certainty in regard to the constitutionality of their preventative actions? 
                                                                                                                 
information, such as dialing, signaling, routing, and addressing information (DRAS) as well 
as other basic and transactional subscriber information. E.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 27012709 
(2012); 18 U.S.C. §§ 31213127 (2012); 50 U.S.C. §§ 18411846, 1861 (2012). This 
Article focuses on issues relating to the government’s ability to obtain the content of 
communications. 
 9. Although the Supreme Court has never directly ruled on the constitutionality of 
FISA or Title III, lower federal courts have rejected all facial challenges to these statutes. 
E.g., In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 746 (Foreign Int. Surv. Ct. Rev. 2002) (holding FISA 
constitutional); United States v. Bobo, 477 F.2d 974, 982 (4th Cir. 1973) (holding Title III 
constitutional and citing widespread agreement across the circuits on its constitutionality). 
 10. Issues relating to the use of wiretaps during a time of war are beyond the scope of 
this Article. FISA, however, does authorize the “President, through the Attorney General . . . 
to acquire foreign intelligence information for a period not to exceed fifteen calendar days 
following a declaration of war by the Congress.” 50 U.S.C. § 1811 (2012). 
 11. The Fourth Amendment reads: “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, 
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” U.S. 
CONST. amend. IV. 
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While the Supreme Court has relaxed Fourth Amendment requirements in the 
context of searches designed to serve “special needs,”12 the underlying rationale for 
upholding these searches is that diminished expectations of privacy exist in certain 
circumstances and, when weighed against governmental interests that transcend 
ordinary law enforcement needs, the government’s interests outweigh those 
diminished expectations of privacy.13 In some special needs cases, the federal 
courts have therefore concluded that the Fourth Amendment will tolerate 
suspicionless and even warrantless searches.14 In the hypothetical, however, we can 
stipulate that individual expectations of privacy with respect to the content of the wire 
or electronic communications15 that would be intercepted would be at their zenith. 
Moreover, the emergency exceptions carved out by the Supreme Court require an 
immediacy not necessarily present in our hypothetical.16 The central and fundamental 
issue is, therefore, whether consequence matters from a constitutional perspective. 
The Supreme Court has yet to face a Fourth Amendment case involving the 
potential for massive destruction or catastrophic loss of life from the threatened use 
of a WMD. While the Court stated in dicta more than a decade ago that the “Fourth 
Amendment would almost certainly permit an appropriately tailored roadblock set 
up to thwart an imminent terrorist attack,”17 it has rejected a special crime-scene 
exception to the Fourth Amendment when a murder has taken place.18 Additionally, 
it has recently stated, in a case involving Global Positioning System (GPS) 
                                                                                                                 
 
 12. Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 31314 (1997) (stating that particularized 
exceptions to the individualized suspicion requirement are sometimes warranted when 
special needs concerns other than crime detection are at issue). 
 13. See Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 330 (2001) (“When faced with special law 
enforcement needs, diminished expectations of privacy, minimal intrusions, or the like, the 
Court has found that certain general, or individual, circumstances may render a warrantless 
search or seizure reasonable.”); Ric Simmons, Searching for Terrorists: Why Public Safety is 
Not a Special Need, 59 DUKE L.J. 843, 890 (2010) (“For some of these searches, the 
Supreme Court has stressed that the nature of the intrusion is very slight and that the subject 
has a reduced expectation of privacy . . . .”). 
 14. See infra notes 8596 and accompanying text. 
 15. Under Title III a “wire communication” is defined as “any aural transfer made in 
whole or in part through the use of facilities for the transmission of communications by aid 
of wire, cable, or other like connection between the point of origin and the point of reception 
(including the use of such connection in a switching station) furnished or operated by any 
person engaged in providing or operating such facilities for the transmission of interstate or 
foreign communications or communications affecting interstate or foreign commerce.” 
18 U.S.C. § 2510(1) (2012). Title III defines an “electronic communication” as “any transfer 
of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature transmitted in 
whole or in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic or photooptical system 
that affects interstate or foreign commerce, but does not include [a wire communication].” 
18 U.S.C. § 2510(12) (2012). 
 16. See infra notes 69–84 and accompanying text. 
 17. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 44 (2000) (emphasis added) (citing 
Edmond v. Goldsmith, 183 F.3d 659, 66263 (7th Cir. 1999)). 
 18. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 395 (1978) (rejecting a “murder-scene” exception 
to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement despite the severity of the crime); see also 
Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 511 (1978) (finding that the seriousness of the crime does 
not create an exigency justifying a search without a warrant). 
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monitoring, that there is “no precedent for the proposition that whether a search has 
occurred depends on the nature of the crime being investigated.”19 On the other 
hand, in that same case, five Justices agreed with the proposition that “longer-term 
GPS monitoring . . . of most offenses impinges on expectations of privacy,”20 and 
four Justices stated that the Court did not need to consider whether prolonged GPS 
monitoring in the context of investigations of “ extraordinary offenses would 
similarly intrude on a constitutionally protected sphere of privacy.”21 This suggests 
that a majority of the Court might conclude that consequence should play an 
important role in a Fourth Amendment calculus. Waiting for such a case to reach 
the Court,22 however, is arguably not in the best interests of the nation, particularly 
if solving the no-win scenario requires policy choices more appropriately made by 
elected officials than by judges.23 
The purpose of this Article is to look at consequence, with a particular focus on 
the threatened use of a WMD, and begin a discussion on a new doctrinal solution to 
the hypothetical.24 As background, Part I takes a look at cardinal Fourth 
                                                                                                                 
 
 19. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 954 (2012). 
 20. Id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring, with whom Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan, J. joined) 
(emphasis added); see id. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“I agree with Justice ALITO 
that, at the very least, ‘longer term GPS monitoring in investigations of most offenses 
impinges on expectations of privacy.’” (emphasis added)). 
 21. Id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
 22. See Richard S. Frase, What Were They Thinking? Fourth Amendment 
Unreasonableness in Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 329, 417 (2002) 
(“It seems inevitable that the Court will be presented with one or more cases in which the 
police request additional investigative authority to deal with terrorism or other threats of 
catastrophic harm.”). Recently, the Supreme Court touched on this issue when it considered 
a Fourth Amendment case involving a driver who had been stopped for expired registration 
tags. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014). After the driver’s car was impounded, an 
inventory search revealed two handguns under the car hood. Id. at 2480. At the scene, and 
later at the police station, the police conducted a search of his cellular telephone without a 
warrant, and found text messages and other evidence of gang-related activity. Id. Although 
the Court’s decision was limited to the question of “how the search incident to arrest 
doctrine applies to modern cell phones,” id. at 2484, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy had the 
following exchange with California Solicitor General Edward Dumont during oral argument. 
JUSTICE KENNEDY: It seems to me that in order to try to give some answer 
to [these] concerns that maybe the distinction ought to be between serious and 
nonserious offenses—offenses. I don't think that exists in our jurisprudence. 
Correct me if I'm wrong. 
MR. DUMONT: I think that's correct. The Court has previously declined to 
draw that line. 
Transcript of Oral Argument at 41, Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014) (No. 13-132) 
(emphasis added). 
 23. See infra notes 297316 and accompanying text. 
 24. This Article focuses on a subset of a related and broader issue that other scholars 
have explored—namely, whether “crime-severity” distinctions should affect different Fourth 
Amendment outcomes. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 
HARV. L. REV. 757, 802 (1994); Jeffrey Bellin, Crime-Severity Distinctions and the Fourth 
Amendment: Reassessing Reasonableness in a Changing World, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1, 9 
(2011); Sherry F. Colb, The Qualitative Dimension of Fourth Amendment 
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Amendment principles and rules, as well as the many exceptions to the warrant, 
probable cause, and particularity requirements that the Supreme Court has 
recognized, and analyzes their potential applicability to the hypothetical. Part I also 
seeks to draw the important distinction between reasonable expectations of privacy, 
the analytical framework that governs whether certain government activities 
constitute a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, and the Fourth 
Amendment’s reasonableness requirement, which necessitates a weighing of 
competing constitutional interests. Most significantly, Part I discusses minimization, 
a well-established privacy-enhancing mechanism that normally serves as a back-end 
check on the government’s conduct, to determine whether it can serve as a front-end 
substitute for the Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement. 
Part II briefly explores the differences between chemical, biological, 
radiological, and nuclear WMDs, as well as the different consequences that can 
reasonably be anticipated from their respective use.25 Identifying those differences 
is critical to understanding how the significant definitional issues identified in Part 
III might affect the implementation of any new doctrinal solution. Part IV then 
looks at these issues through what I have elsewhere described as the “Fourth 
Amendment’s protective lens,”26 and proposes that we use a probability 
consequence matrix as an analytical framework to solve the no-win scenario. 
Finally, Part V seeks to lay out a path forward so that Congress can consider and 
enact sensible legislation that will enable us to identify the limited circumstances in 
which consequence should be considered a factor in a Fourth Amendment calculus, 
particularly when a terrorist threatens to use a WMD. 
I. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
A. Principles and Rules 
The Fourth Amendment is a “compound sentence consisting of two related 
clauses.”27 The first clause provides that the “right of the people to be secure in 
                                                                                                                 
“Reasonableness,” 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1642, 1660 (1998); Frase, supra note 22, at 420; 
Ronald M. Gould & Simon Stern, Catastrophic Threats and the Fourth Amendment, 77 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 777, 81923 (2004); John Kaplan, The Limits of the Exclusionary Rule, 26 
STAN. L. REV. 1027, 1037 (1974); Wesley MacNeil Oliver, Toward a Better Categorical 
Balance of the Costs and Benefits of the Exclusionary Rule, 9 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 201, 241, 
246 (2005); Richard A. Posner, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 49, 
53, 74 (1981); William A. Schroeder, Factoring the Seriousness of the Offense into Fourth 
Amendment Equations—Warrantless Entries into Premises: The Legacy of Welsh v. 
Wisconsin, 38 U. KAN. L. REV. 439, 52829 (1990); Simmons, supra note 13, at 895; 
William J. Stuntz, Commentary, O.J. Simpson, Bill Clinton, and the Transsubstantive Fourth 
Amendment, 114 HARV. L. REV. 842, 875 (2001). 
 25. Part II is based upon unclassified sources of information that are available to the 
general public. 
 26. Scott J. Glick, Virtual Checkpoints and Cyber-Terry Stops: Digital Scans to Protect 
the Nation’s Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources, 6 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 97, 
125 (2012) (arguing that the Fourth Amendment’s “protective lens” strongly supports the 
existence of a limited “cybersecurity exception”). 
 27. Morgan Cloud, Review, Searching Through History; Searching for History, 63 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1707, 1721 (1996); see also Owen Fiss, Even in a Time of Terror, 31 YALE L. & 
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their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, shall not be violated.”28 The second, commonly referred to as the “warrant 
clause,”29 provides that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the person or things to be seized.”30 
A “search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment takes place whenever 
the government intrudes upon “an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to 
consider reasonable.”31 This formulation, which flows from Justice John Marshall 
Harlan’s concurring opinion in Katz v. United States,32 breaks down into a “two-
part inquiry: first, has the individual manifested a subjective expectation of privacy 
in the object of the challenged search? Second, is society willing to recognize that 
expectation as reasonable?”33 If the government's conduct violates a person’s 
reasonable expectation of privacy, or involves a trespass or physical intrusion upon 
a constitutionally protected area, then the courts will consider the government’s 
conduct to be a search.34 By way of comparison, a “seizure” within the meaning of 
the Fourth Amendment only takes place when there has been a “meaningful 
interference with an individual's possessory interests in that property,”35 or when 
there has been a “governmental termination of freedom of movement through 
means intentionally applied.”36 Thus, the threshold question in any Fourth 
Amendment calculus is whether a search or seizure has occurred.37 Only after that 
determination has been made do we turn to the question of whether that search or 
seizure is reasonable. 
Notwithstanding the fact that many scholars have criticized the Supreme Court 
for its lack of clarity and consistency in its treatment of the Fourth Amendment,38 a 
                                                                                                                 
POL’Y REV. 1, 25 (2012) (“The Fourth Amendment has an unusual grammatical 
structure…[that] consists of two clauses.”). 
 28. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 29. 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT § 3.1(a), at 3–4 (5th ed. 2012) (noting that this clause is “customarily referred 
to as the warrant clause”). 
 30. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 31. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984). 
 32. 389 U.S. 347, 360–62 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). See generally 1 LAFAVE, 
supra note 29, at 576–93. 
 33. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986) (citing Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 
735, 740 (1979)). 
 34. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 953 (2012) (holding that placing a GPS 
tracking device on a vehicle for the purpose of obtaining information constitutes a trespass 
and therefore a search in a constitutionally protected area, and stating that “[s]ituations 
involving merely the transmission of electronic signals without trespass . . . remain subject to 
Katz analysis” (emphasis omitted)); see also Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 771 (1983) 
(stating that “[t]he Fourth Amendment protects legitimate expectations of privacy rather than 
simply places”). 
 35. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 113. 
 36. Brower v. Cnty. of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 597 (1989) (emphasis omitted). 
 37. See generally Scott J. Glick, Note, Reexamining Fourth Amendment Seizures: A 
New Starting Point, 9 HOFSTRA L. REV. 211 (1980) (discussing an analytical framework for 
determining whether a seizure has occurred). 
 38. E.g., Amar, supra note 24, at 757 (“The Fourth Amendment today is an 
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half century of jurisprudence has yielded a number of fundamental principles and 
rules. First, as the Supreme Court has repeatedly stated, the Fourth Amendment has 
a “strong preference for searches conducted pursuant to a warrant.”39 Although the 
text itself does not delineate when precisely a warrant must be obtained,40 the 
Supreme Court has concluded that all warrantless searches are “per se 
unreasonable” subject only to “established and well-delineated exceptions.”41 
Accordingly, unless such an exception applies, the government must obtain a court 
order from a “neutral and detached” magistrate authorizing the search.42 
A search warrant cannot be lawfully issued by a court unless it is supported by 
“Oath or affirmation” that establishes probable cause to believe that a crime has 
been committed and that evidence of the crime is located in the place to be 
searched.43 Moreover, search warrants must “particularly” describe the place to be 
searched and the items to be seized.44 Notably, “the Fourth Amendment does not 
elaborate on the meaning of probable cause.”45 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has 
emphasized that the probable cause standard is a “practical, nontechnical 
conception”46—a “fluid concept . . . not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat 
set of legal rules,”47 that requires courts to take into account competing interests.48 
The Constitution’s text does not define the quantum of proof that would satisfy 
the probable cause standard.49 While it is clear that a court cannot authorize a 
search or seizure based on “mere suspicion”50 or “affidavits which are purely 
conclusory,”51 the Supreme Court has stated that probable cause exists “where the 
                                                                                                                 
embarrassment.”); David E. Steinberg, The Uses and Misuses of Fourth Amendment History, 
10 U. PA. J. CONST. L., 581, 581 (2008) (“The doctrinal incoherence of Fourth Amendment 
law disturbs many judges and scholars.”). The Supreme Court has also been critical of its 
own jurisprudence. E.g., California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 583 (1991) (Scalia, J., 
concurring in judgment) (“There can be no clarity in this area unless we make up our minds, 
and unless the principles we express comport with the actions we take.”); Coolidge v. New 
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 483 (1971) (explaining that Fourth Amendment law has not been 
reduced to “complete order and harmony”). 
 39. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996); Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 
U.S. 727, 733 (1984); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236 (1983). 
 40. Kentucky v. King, 131 S.Ct. 1849, 1856 (2011). 
 41. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (emphasis omitted). 
 42. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948) (inferences should be “drawn by a 
neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often 
competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime”). 
 43. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 44. See Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 56 (1967) (acknowledging that there is an 
especially great need for particularity when judicial authorization is sought for electronic 
eavesdropping). 
 45. Fiss, supra note 27, at 20. 
 46. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231 (1983) (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 
U.S. 160, 176 (1949)). 
 47. Id. at 231. 
 48. See Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 176 (explaining that probable cause is a “practical, 
nontechnical conception affording the best compromise that has been found for 
accommodating . . . opposing interests”); infra note 66 and accompanying text. 
 49. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 50. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 479 (1963). 
 51. United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108 (1965). 
2015] THE FOURTH AMENDMENT’S “NO-WIN” SCENARIO 9 
 
known facts and circumstances are sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable 
prudence in the belief that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found.”52 
However, the Supreme Court has also stated that “finely tuned” standards, such as 
preponderance of the evidence,53 are more appropriate to formal adversarial 
proceedings and have “no place” in a magistrate’s probable cause determination.54 
Thus, in determining whether probable cause exists, the Supreme Court has 
directed magistrates and judges to look at all of the circumstances and determine 
whether there is “a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be 
found in a particular place.”55 
The Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement (“no Warrants shall issue, 
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized”)56 
serves a slightly different, albeit related, purpose to the probable cause requirement. 
The particularity requirement serves as a check on the government’s ability to 
obtain a “general” warrant, which was a source of great concern to the Framers.57 
While an academic debate may exist with regard to whether the Framers only 
opposed general warrants of the home (compared to general warrants of 
commercial or other highly regulated businesses)58 taken together, the Fourth 
Amendment’s probable cause and particularly requirements “minimize the risk that 
                                                                                                                 
 
 52. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996). 
 53. In order to meet the preponderance of the evidence standard, a party must establish 
that “on the whole” of the evidence, he “has the stronger evidence, however slight the edge 
may be.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (10th ed. 2014); see CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & 
LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE, 109 (4th ed. 2009) (stating that the fact finder must be 
“persuaded that the points to be proved are more probably so than not”). 
 54. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 235 (1983). 
 55. Id. at 238. Moreover, the role of the reviewing court “is simply to ensure that the 
magistrate had a ‘substantial basis for . . . conclud[ing]’ that probable cause existed.” Id. at 238–
39 (alteration in original) (citation omitted); accord Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 U.S. 727, 
73233 (1984) (stating that the reviewing court should decide “whether the evidence viewed as a 
whole provided a ‘substantial basis’ for the Magistrate’s finding of probable cause”). 
 56. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (emphasis added). 
 57. See Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84 (1987) (“By limiting the authorization to 
search to the specific areas and things for which there is probable cause to search, the 
requirement ensures that the search will be carefully tailored to its justifications, and will not 
take on the character of the wide-ranging exploratory searches the Framers intended to 
prohibit.”); Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2494 (2014) (“Our cases have recognized 
that the Fourth Amendment was the founding generation’s response to the reviled ‘general 
warrants’ and ‘writs of assistance’ of the colonial era . . . .”); Steinberg, supra note 38, at 594 
(noting that “the Framers viewed . . . the general warrant as dangerous and subject to 
abuse”). For a comprehensive history of the Fourth Amendment, see generally WILLIAM J. 
CUDDIHY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: ORIGINS AND MEANING 602–1791 (2009). 
 58. See Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 58 (1967) (“The use of [general warrants] 
was a motivating factor behind the Declaration of Independence.”). But see CUDDIHY, supra 
note 57, at 743 (“Even the states with the strongest constitutional restrictions on general 
searches had long exposed commercial establishments to warrantless inspection.”). See 
generally Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 
547, 551 (1999) (explaining that the Framers discussions were “almost exclusively about the 
need to ban house searches under general warrants”). 
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officers executing search warrants will by mistake search a place other than the 
place intended by the magistrate.”59 In the context of the hypothetical and the need 
to intercept the terrorist’s communications, the particularity requirement ensures 
that the government is directed to acquire only the communications that the 
magistrate has authorized. As the Supreme Court has stated, the need for 
particularity here is “especially great” since wiretapping involves an “intrusion on 
privacy that is broad in scope.”60 The particularity requirement therefore requires a 
neutral and detached magistrate to approve the communications that may be 
searched as well as the communications that may be seized.61 
Finally, the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness clause (“[t]he right of the 
people to be secure . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated”)62 serves as an additional check on the government’s conduct by 
preventing the government from exceeding the authorized scope of the warrant, and 
by ensuring that the police do not act impermissibly in executing the 
court-approved search or seizure.63 While some Supreme Court decisions may have 
raised a question in regard to whether or not the reasonableness clause and the 
warrant clause were intended to be read in the disjunctive or in the conjunctive,64 
today it is “clearly established that the [reasonableness] clause does provide some 
additional power.”65 Thus, even when the warrant clause is satisfied, courts are still 
required to assess the degree to which a search or seizure is reasonable; that is, 
courts are required to assess the degree to which the search or seizure intrudes on 
an individual’s privacy in relation to “the degree to which it is needed for the 
promotion of legitimate governmental interests.”66 
                                                                                                                 
 
 59. 2 LAFAVE, supra note 29, § 4.5, at 709; see also Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 
561 (2004) (explaining that the particularity requirement also assures the “limits” of the 
search); 2 LAFAVE, supra note 29, § 4.5(b), at 731 (“A search warrant for an apartment 
house or hotel or other multi-occupancy building will usually be held invalid if it fails to 
describe the particular subunit to be searched with sufficient definiteness to preclude a 
search of one or more subunits indiscriminately.”); 3 LAFAVE, supra note 29, § 7.2(c), at 751 
(suggesting that particularity limits the intensity of the search and minimizes the risk that 
innocent objects will be seized by mistake). 
 60. Berger, 388 U.S. at 56; see also Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 482 n.11 
(1976) (“[R]esponsible officials . . . must take care to assure that [searches] are conducted in 
a manner that minimizes unwarranted intrusions upon privacy.”). 
 61. See Berger, 338 U.S. at 59 (finding several constitutional defects in New York’s 
wiretapping statute including that it gave “too much to the discretion of the officer executing 
the order”); 5 LAFAVE, supra note 29, § 10.1(c), at 22 (explaining that because particularity 
limits what a police officer may seize and where he may look, “[t]he police may not look in 
an envelope for an elephant”). 
 62. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (emphasis added). 
 63. See Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 611 (1999) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment does 
require that police actions in execution of a warrant be related to the objectives of the 
authorized intrusion[.]”). 
 64. See Cloud, supra note 27, at 1722–23; see also Amar, supra note 24, at 76281. 
 65. 2 LAFAVE, supra note 29, § 3.1(a), at 4. 
 66. Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 848 (2006); see also United States v. Knights, 
534 U.S. 112, 118–19 (2001) (“[T]he reasonableness of a search is determined ‘by assessing, 
on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual’s privacy and, on the 
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A review of the foregoing principles and rules might lead one to conclude that it 
is not possible to solve the Fourth Amendment’s no-win scenario. Yet, as discussed 
below, a close examination of decades of Supreme Court jurisprudence, including a 
number of exceptions that have been approved by the Court, reveals the potential 
for a new doctrinal solution. 
B. Exceptions 
Historically, a person’s home has been given the greatest degree of protection 
under the Fourth Amendment.67 Yet, the Supreme Court has not always required 
law enforcement officers to obtain a warrant to enter a home and, in certain 
circumstances, the probable cause and the particularity requirements have also been 
relaxed, prompting one scholar to opine that Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is a 
“doctrinal mess.”68 This Part will review exceptions to the Fourth Amendment’s 
warrant, probable cause, and particularity requirements, in order to assess their 
potential applicability to the hypothetical. 
1. The Warrant Requirement 
The Supreme Court and the federal courts have identified three related 
exigent-circumstance exceptions to the warrant requirement: hot pursuit, loss or 
destruction of evidence, and emergency aid.69 In Warden v. Hayden,70 the Supreme 
Court recognized that the hot pursuit of a fleeing felon does not require the police 
to obtain a warrant prior to entering a home. In Warden, the government had been 
                                                                                                                 
other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental 
interests.’” (quoting Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999))); Richards v. 
Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 394 (1997) (balancing the “legitimate law enforcement concerns at 
issue in the execution of search warrants and the individual privacy interests affected by no-
knock entries”); Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8 (1985) (“We have described ‘the 
balancing of competing interests’ as ‘the key principle of the Fourth Amendment.’” (quoting 
Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 700 n.12 (1981))). As Professor LaFave aptly notes, 
however, this “naturally raises the question of whether this ‘compromise’ must always be 
struck in precisely the same way, or whether on the other hand the probable cause 
requirement may call for a greater or lesser quantum of evidence, depending upon the facts 
and circumstances of the individual case.” 2 LAFAVE, supra note 29, §3.2(a), at 30. 
 67. E.g., United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 5354 (1993) 
(stating that a person’s right to “maintain control over his home, and to be free from 
governmental interference, is a private interest of historic and continuing importance”); 
United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714 (1984) (“[R]esidences are places in which the 
individual normally expects privacy free of governmental intrusion not authorized by a 
warrant, and that expectation is plainly one that society is prepared to recognize as 
justifiable. Our cases have not deviated from this basic Fourth Amendment principle.”); 
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980) (“It is a ‘basic principal of Fourth 
Amendment law’ that searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are 
presumptively unreasonable.”). 
 68. Amar, supra note 24, at 759; id. at 757 (observing that warrants are required, unless 
they are not, and that the probable cause requirement has often been ignored). 
 69. See Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 116 n.6 (2006). 
 70. 387 U.S. 294 (1967). 
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informed that an armed robbery had taken place and the suspect had fled into a 
home “less than five minutes before they reached it.”71 Although the police had a 
description of the suspect and the weapons he had used during the robbery, the 
Court held that the Fourth Amendment does not require police officers to obtain a 
warrant and delay the investigation if doing so would “gravely endanger their lives 
or the lives or others.”72 The Court further stated that “[s]peed here was essential, 
and only a thorough search of the house for persons and weapons could have 
insured that [the suspect] was the only man present and that the police had control 
of all weapons which could be used against them or to effect an escape.”73 
Stated another way, Warden and its progeny stand for the proposition that where 
probable cause to obtain a warrant exists but the exigency of the particular situation 
makes it impossible to obtain a warrant, the Fourth Amendment will tolerate a 
warrantless entry into a home to make an arrest.74 Notably, however, the Supreme 
Court has observed that many lower courts have looked at the hot pursuit exception 
in relation to the crime that has been committed, and the gravity of the offense.75 
That consideration becomes significant as we consider whether consequence, which 
is directly tied to the gravity of the risk posed by a WMD, should play an 
outcome-determinative role in a Fourth Amendment analysis. 
The Supreme Court has also relaxed the warrant requirement to prevent the loss 
or destruction of evidence. For example, in Schmerber v. California,76 the 
defendant was under arrest in a hospital for driving while under the influence of 
alcohol. The Court concluded that the police could take a blood sample from the 
defendant without a warrant since there had been a lawful arrest, and delay could 
lead to a destruction of the evidence.77 Indeed, when emergency or exceptional 
circumstances threaten the loss or destruction of evidence, the federal courts have 
consistently approved warrantless searches.78 Here too, however, even where the 
government can establish a potential loss of evidence, the Court has rejected a 
warrantless entry into a home if the offense the government is pursuing is only a 
                                                                                                                 
 
 71. Id. at 298. 
 72. Id. at 29899. 
 73. Id. at 299. 
 74. See id. at 298–99; Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 750 (1984); United States v. 
Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 4243 (1976). 
 75. E.g., Welsh, 466 U.S. at 752; United States v. Cattouse, 846 F.2d 144, 146 (2d Cir. 
1988) (finding that the gravity of the offense is a relevant factor in determining whether 
exigent circumstances exist); United States v. Martinez-Gonzalez, 686 F.2d 93, 100–01 (2d 
Cir. 1982) (noting the seriousness of the offense justifying warrantless entry); Dorman v. 
United States, 435 F.2d 385, 392 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (emphasizing the gravity of the offense). 
 76. 384 U.S. 757 (1966). 
 77. Id. at 770. One of the underlying rationales for the automobile search exception to 
the warrant requirement is the potential for the loss of evidence. See Chambers v. Maroney, 
399 U.S. 42, 48 (1970) (noting that vehicles can be “quickly moved”). 
 78. E.g., Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006). Compare United States v. 
Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 52 (1951) (finding unlawful entry where there was no imminent 
destruction, removal, or concealment of property) with McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 
451, 455 (1948) (noting that there was no property that was in the process of being destroyed). 
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minor one,79 which further suggests that the nature of an offense is important and 
can play a limiting role as well. 
The Supreme Court has also approved warrantless entry into a home to assist a 
person in need of immediate aid.80 The Court has stated that “[t]he need to protect 
or preserve life or avoid serious injury is justification for what would be otherwise 
illegal absent an exigency or emergency.”81 Moreover, the Court has approved the 
use of a brief “protective sweep” in a home without a warrant, if the sweep was 
preceded by a lawful arrest of an occupant of the home.82 The Court has made it 
clear in the protective sweep cases, however, that the burden is on the government 
to establish a reasonable basis to believe that the area “harbors an individual posing 
a danger to those on the arrest scene.”83 Indeed, such a search must be limited in 
time and location; that is, it must be “no longer than is necessary to dispel the 
reasonable suspicion of danger” and limited to places where a person, not evidence, 
might be located.84 
These cases illustrate that the protection and preservation of life is a factor that 
could justify what might otherwise be an unacceptable intrusion on privacy. 
However, they also stand for the proposition that important limiting considerations 
exist, even when there is danger to life. 
2. The Probable Cause Requirement 
As discussed earlier, probable cause is at the core of the Fourth Amendment’s 
warrant requirement. Yet, the Supreme Court has relaxed the probable cause 
requirement in what have become known as the “special needs”85 or 
“administrative search”86 cases, thereby enabling the government to conduct 
                                                                                                                 
 
 79. See Welsh, 466 U.S. at 750; 3 LAFAVE, supra note 29, § 6.5(a), at 515 (suggesting 
that exigent circumstances has a “hollow ring” when there is no emergency and evidence is 
not in the process of destruction); see also MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE, 
§ 260.5 (1973) (stating that a warrantless search of premises may be undertaken upon 
reasonable cause to believe that premises contain “(1) individuals in imminent danger of 
death or serious bodily harm; or (2) things imminently likely to burn, explode, or otherwise 
cause death, serious bodily harm or substantial destruction of property”). 
 80. E.g., Michigan v. Fisher, 130 S. Ct. 546, 549 (2009) (per curiam). 
 81. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392 (1978) (quoting Wayne v. United States, 318 
F.2d 205, 212 (D.C. Cir. 1963)). 
 82. Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 337 (1990) (approving a warrantless protective 
sweep of premises following an in-home arrest in order to find others who might pose a 
danger to officers). 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 334 (approving a “look in closets and other spaces immediately adjoining the 
place of arrest from which an attack could be immediately launched”). 
 85. E.g., Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995) (random drug 
testing of student athletes); Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 
665–66 (1989) (drug tests for United States Customs Service employees seeking transfer or 
promotion to certain positions); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 620–21 
(1989) (drug and alcohol tests for railway employees involved in train accidents or found to 
be in violation of particular safety regulations). 
 86. E.g., New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 702–04 (1987) (warrantless administrative 
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certain kinds of warrantless searches without probable cause or any degree of 
individualized suspicion.87 In these cases, which generally developed outside of the 
terrorism context, the Court upheld suspicionless, and sometimes warrantless, 
searches that furthered a “special need[], beyond the normal need for law 
enforcement.”88 The Court looked at the “programmatic purpose”89 that motivated 
the government’s conduct to ensure that the government was seeking to protect 
against a “concrete danger”90 independent of general law enforcement purposes.91 
If the Court found such a programmatic purpose, as in the case of sobriety 
checkpoints where the animating purpose is to eliminate the “immediate, 
vehicle-bound threat to life and limb”92 that results from the presence of intoxicated 
drivers on the public highways, then it would uphold the search and seizure.93 
While a compelling governmental need is a prerequisite for the relaxation of 
the probable cause requirement in these cases, as the Supreme Court has made 
clear, alone it has not been sufficient. Essential to the Court’s analyses has been the 
consideration of other factors, such as the reasonableness of the search and the 
level of intrusion on an individual’s privacy.94 For example, in upholding a 
                                                                                                                 
inspection of premises of “closely regulated” business); Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 
507–09, 511–12 (1978) (administrative inspection of fire-damaged premises to determine 
cause of blaze); Camara v. Mun. Court of S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 534–39 (1967) (administrative 
inspection to ensure compliance with city housing code that was not aimed at “the discovery 
of evidence of crime”). 
 87. Nat’l Treasury Employees Union, 489 U.S. at 665 (emphasizing that “neither a 
warrant nor probable cause, nor, indeed, any measure of individualized suspicion, is an 
indispensable component of reasonableness in every circumstance”). See generally 5 
LAFAVE, supra note 29, § 10.1. 
 88. Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 313 (1997). 
 89. See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 45–46 (2000) (“[P]rogrammatic 
purposes may be relevant to the validity of Fourth Amendment intrusions undertaken 
pursuant to a general scheme without individualized suspicion.”). 
 90. Chandler, 520 U.S. at 318–19. 
 91. See O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 720 (1987) (plurality opinion) (“There are 
some . . . ‘exceptional circumstances in which special needs, beyond the normal need for 
law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable.’” 
(quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 335, 351 (1985))); In re Directives Pursuant to 
Section 105B of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 551 F.3d 1004, 1011–12 (Foreign 
Int. Surv. Ct. Rev. 2008) (finding a foreign intelligence exception to the Fourth Amendment 
because national security is of “the highest order of magnitude” and the “programmatic 
purpose of the surveillances .  .  .  involves some legitimate objective beyond ordinary 
crime control”); Cassidy v. Chertoff, 471 F.3d 67, 82 (2d Cir. 2006) (“Preventing or 
deterring large-scale terrorist attacks present problems that are distinct from standard law 
enforcement needs and indeed go well beyond them.”); cf. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 43 (“We are 
particularly reluctant to recognize exceptions to the general rule of individualized suspicion 
where governmental authorities primarily pursue their general crime control ends.”). 
 92. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 43 (discussing Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 
444, 451 (1990)). 
 93. See Sitz, 496 U.S. at 451 (1990) (“[A]lcohol-related death and mutilation on the 
Nation’s roads are legion.”). 
 94. E.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 830–38 (2002) (holding that the school’s 
interest in preventing drug use outweighed limited intrusion and reduced privacy interests); 
United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 119–20 (2001) (holding probationers and parolees 
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drug-testing program for the Vernonia, Oregon, school district—one that was not 
predicated on probable cause—Justice Antonin Scalia, writing for a majority of 
the Court, stated that “the ultimate measure of the constitutionality of a 
governmental search is ‘reasonableness,’” particularly in cases where there was “no 
clear practice, either approving or disapproving the type of search at issue, at the 
time the constitutional provision was enacted.”95 Whether a particular search meets 
the reasonableness standard should be “judged by balancing its intrusion on the 
individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate 
governmental interests.”96 
None of the cases in which the Supreme Court relaxed the probable cause 
requirement to allow the government to meet special or administrative search needs 
arose in the context of the government seeking to prevent the use of a WMD. On 
the other hand, the Court opined in the dicta of Keith, which concerned electronic 
surveillance conducted by the government in connection with a plot to bomb a 
Central Intelligence Agency office in Michigan, that reasonableness was a flexible 
standard that should be adapted to the government’s need.97 The Court stated in 
Keith that “[d]ifferent standards may be compatible with the Fourth Amendment if 
they are reasonable both in relation to the legitimate need of Government for 
intelligence information and the protected rights of our citizens.”98 Although Keith 
involved an American political group and not foreign powers and their agents,99 it 
was followed by decisions of the Courts of Appeal for the Third, Fourth, Fifth, and 
Ninth Circuits, each of which found a foreign intelligence exception to the Fourth 
Amendment’s warrant requirement.100 When that question was presented to the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review, the special Article III appellate 
court established by Congress to review foreign intelligence collection by the 
executive branch, the FISA Court of Review explicitly stated that while “threat to 
society is not dispositive in determining whether a search or seizure is reasonable, 
it certainly remains a crucial factor.”101 
Determining that a programmatic102 need to address foreign national security 
threats can support a foreign intelligence exception to the Fourth Amendment’s 
                                                                                                                 
have diminished expectations of privacy); United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 315–16 
(1972) (discussing a business fully aware of the pervasive regulation in their field and thus 
having a reduced expectation of privacy). 
 95. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S 646, 652 (1995). 
 96. Id. at 652–53 (quoting Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 
(1989)); see also supra note 66 and accompanying text. 
 97. United States v. U.S. Dist. Ct. (Keith), 407 U.S. 297 (1972). The case is known as 
Keith because the government filed a writ of mandamus against the Honorable Damon Keith, 
United States District Court Judge, when he ordered the government to disclose wiretapping 
information. 
 98. Id. at 322–23 (emphasis added). 
 99. Id. at 321–22. 
 100. United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908, 913 (4th Cir. 1980); United 
States v. Buck, 548 F.2d 871, 875 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593, 
605 (3d Cir. 1974); United States v. Brown, 484 F.2d 418, 426 (5th Cir. 1973). But see 
Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 613–14 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (en banc). 
 101. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 746 (Foreign Int. Surv. Ct. Rev. 2002) (emphasis 
added). 
 102. E.g., In re Directives Pursuant to Section 105B of the Foreign Intelligence 
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warrant requirement, however, does not provide strong precedent for the notion that 
the gravity of the offense permits the government to target an indeterminate number 
of communication devices in the United States in response to a specific, 
intelligence-driven WMD threat. Yet more than sixty years ago (and three years 
before he issued his seminal concurring opinion in the Steel Seizure case)103, 
Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson planted the seeds of the principle that 
consequence could be a factor in determining whether or not to relax the probable 
cause requirement. In Brinegar v. United States,104 the defendant was prosecuted 
for illegally importing liquor into Oklahoma from Missouri, and his conviction was 
based, in part, on the use of evidence seized from his automobile.105 Prior to trial, 
Brinegar moved to suppress the evidence, and the Court held that there was 
probable cause to search his automobile.106 In his dissent, Justice Jackson expressed 
concern that the Fourth Amendment’s automobile exception107 was being taken as 
“blanket authority to stop and search cars on suspicion”108; that is, without probable 
cause. Justice Jackson then suggested that the gravity of the offense should be 
considered in certain circumstances.109 He spoke specifically to the issue of 
indiscriminate searches performed by police officers: 
[I]f we are to make judicial exceptions to the Fourth Amendment . . . , 
it seems to me they should depend somewhat upon the gravity of the 
offense. If we assume, for example, that a child is kidnapped and the 
officers throw a roadblock about the neighborhood and search every 
outgoing car, it would be a drastic and undiscriminating use of the 
search. The officers might be unable to show probable cause for 
searching any particular car. However, I should candidly strive hard to 
sustain such an action, executed fairly and in good faith, because it 
might be reasonable to subject travelers to that indignity if it was the 
                                                                                                                 
Surveillance Act, 551 F.3d 1004, 1011–12 (Foreign Int. Surv. Ct. Rev. 2008) (stating that 
the programmatic purpose of FISA collection is a “legitimate objective beyond ordinary 
crime control”). It should be noted that in 2008, Congress amended FISA and expanded the 
definition of “foreign power” and agents thereof to include an “entity not substantially 
composed of United States persons” or “any person other than a United States person” who 
is “engaged in the international proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.” Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 110-261, 1222 Stat. 2436 (codified as 
amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801(a)(7), (b)(1)(E)) (2008). This 2008 amendment, however, 
does not solve the issue posed by the hypothetical because, unlike the hypothetical, FISA 
requires that when the government seeks to target communications devices in the United 
States, it must target a specific communications device or facility. See 50 U.S.C. 
§ 1805(a)(2)(B) (2012) (stating probable cause is required with respect to “each of the 
facilities or places at which the electronic surveillance is directed is being used, or is about to 
be used by a foreign power or agent of a foreign power”). 
 103. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 634–55 
(1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 104. 338 U.S. 160 (1949). 
 105. Id. at 161–62. 
 106. Id. at 177–78. 
 107. The automobile exception was first articulated by the Supreme Court twenty-four 
years earlier in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 151–53 (1925). 
 108. 338 U.S. at 183 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
 109. Id. 
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only way to save a threatened life and detect a vicious crime. But I 
should not strain to sustain such a roadblock and universal search to 
salvage a few bottles of bourbon and catch a bootlegger.110 
More than three decades later, the Supreme Court referenced gravity of the 
offense in a number of cases discussing the Fourth Amendment. In Mincey v. 
Arizona,111 the Court was confronted with a case in which, after arresting the 
defendant for shooting a police officer, the police had conducted a four-day 
warrantless search of the defendant’s apartment.112 In Mincey, the Court rejected 
the notion that gravity of the offense was sufficient to justify the warrantless search 
when it explicitly rejected a murder-scene exception to the warrant requirement.113 
However, in Welsh v. Wisconsin,114 decided six years later, the Court seems to have 
taken a different view. In Welsh, the police had gained entry into a home without a 
warrant in connection with their investigation of a car accident.115 Writing for the 
majority, Justice William Brennan stated that “an important factor to be considered 
when determining whether any exigency exists is the gravity of the underlying 
offense for which the arrest is being made.”116 Six months after Welsh was decided, 
Justice John Paul Stevens observed in another case that “a standard that varies the 
extent of the permissible intrusion with the gravity of the suspected offense is . . . 
consistent with common-law experience and this Court’s precedent”117 and was 
almost “too clear for argument.”118 Indeed, later that year, the Court recognized a 
crime-severity distinction in Tennessee v. Garner119 when it held that the use of 
deadly force was reasonable in self-defense or when there was “probable cause to 
believe that [the suspect] has committed a crime involving the infliction or 
threatened infliction of serious physical harm.”120 
Fifteen years later, two cases reached the Supreme Court in which the Court 
alluded to the issue of whether there should be different Fourth Amendment 
standards for grave threats. At issue in City of Indianapolis v. Edmond121 was a 
                                                                                                                 
 
 110. Id. (emphasis added). Arguably the seed was planted by Justice Jackson six months 
earlier. See McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 459–60 (1948) (Jackson, J., 
concurring) (“Whether there is reasonable necessity for a search without waiting to obtain a 
warrant certainly depends somewhat upon the gravity of the offense thought to be in progress 
as well as the hazards of the method of attempting to reach it.” (emphasis added)). 
 111. 437 U.S. 385 (1978). 
 112. Id. at 388–89. 
 113. Id. at 390. 
 114. 466 U.S. 740 (1984). 
 115. Id. at 742–43. 
 116. Id. at 753 (emphasis added). 
 117. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 378–79 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part) (emphasis added). 
 118. Id. at 380. 
 119. 471 U.S. 1 (1985). 
 120. Id. at 11 (emphasis added). Jeffrey Bellin has concluded that Garner provides 
“doctrinal support” for the principle that “[a]s a matter of Fourth Amendment 
reasonableness, crimes involving the threat of serious physical harm warrant more intrusive 
government responses than crimes that do not.” Bellin, supra note 24, at 32. 
 121. 531 U.S. 32 (2000). 
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drug interdiction checkpoint that had been established by law enforcement 
authorities. After reviewing a series of decisions that involved suspicionless 
roadblocks and checkpoints, including the border search and drunk-driving 
roadblock cases, the Court stated that the “gravity of the threat alone cannot be 
dispositive of questions concerning what means law enforcement officers may 
employ to pursue a given purpose.”122 Although combatting illegal narcotics 
trafficking was a “social harm[] of the first magnitude,”123 it did not reach the level 
that warranted a relaxation of the Fourth Amendment’s individualized suspicion 
(probable cause) requirement. Since the primary purpose of the drug interdiction 
checkpoint was indistinguishable from a “general interest in crime control,” the 
checkpoint ran afoul of the Fourth Amendment.124 Notably, however, in a statement 
remarkably reminiscent of Justice Jackson’s dissent in Brinegar, Justice Sandra 
Day O’Connor, writing for the majority of the Court, stated that “the Fourth 
Amendment would almost certainly permit an appropriately tailored roadblock set 
up to thwart an imminent terrorist attack or to catch a dangerous criminal who is 
likely to flee by way of a particular route.”125 
The second case decided by the Supreme Court in 2000 that alluded to 
circumstances involving a grave offense was Florida v. J.L.,126 a stop and frisk 
case. In J.L., the police received an anonymous tip that a “young black male 
standing at a particular bus stop and wearing a plaid shirt was carrying a gun.”127 
When the police responded to the location, they observed three individuals, one of 
whom was wearing a plaid shirt.128 Apart from the tip, the police had no reason to 
suspect illegal conduct by any of the individuals.129 Nonetheless, the police stopped 
the individuals, frisked them, and discovered a firearm.130 The Court held that the 
tip lacked sufficient indicia of reliability and was not, without more, sufficient to 
justify a police officer’s stop and frisk.131 The Court noted that the tip “provided no 
predictive information and therefore left the police without means to test the 
informant’s knowledge or credibility.”132 Although the Court stated that “[f]irearms 
are dangerous, and extraordinary dangers sometimes justify unusual 
precautions,”133 it declined to adopt a firearm exception under which a tip alleging 
an illegal gun would justify a stop and frisk. The majority then went on to state the 
following in regard to a circumstance where there might be an extraordinary 
danger, such as a report of a person carrying a bomb: “The facts of this case do not 
                                                                                                                 
 
 122. Id. at 42 (emphasis added). 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. at 44. 
 125. Id. (emphasis added). But see Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 347–50 
(2001) (rejecting a distinction between minor and other crimes when determining whether 
warrantless arrests are permissible). 
 126. 529 U.S. 266 (2000). 
 127. Id. at 268. 
 128. Id.  
 129. Id.  
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. at 271–74. 
 132. Id. at 271. 
 133. Id. at 272 (emphasis added). 
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require the Court to speculate about the circumstances under which the danger 
alleged in an anonymous tip might be so great as to justify a search even without a 
showing of reliability.”134 
In the past decade, two Supreme Court decisions have referenced gravity of the 
offense as a potential factor in a Fourth Amendment calculus. In Illinois v. 
Lidster,135 the Court addressed the issue of whether brief stops of motorists at 
highway checkpoints, which were designed to enable the police to obtain 
information about a recent fatal hit-and-run accident, were presumptively 
unreasonable. After reviewing its decision in Edmond, the Court noted that brief 
information-seeking highway stops were “less likely to provoke anxiety or to prove 
intrusive,”136 and that in judging reasonableness, courts should also “look to ‘the 
gravity of the public concerns served by the seizure, [and] the degree to which the 
seizure advances the public interest.’”137 
If the seeds of the gravity of the offense principle were planted by Justice 
Jackson in Brinegar and were watered by Justice O’Connor in Edmond, then they 
were surely nourished by the Supreme Court in its recent decision in United States 
v. Jones.138 Jones involved the question of whether the attachment of a GPS 
tracking device to an individual’s vehicle, and the subsequent use of that device to 
monitor the vehicle’s movements on the public street by the government, 
constituted a search.139 Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia concluded that the 
installation of the GPS device constituted a trespass and therefore was a search 
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.140 Notably, however, Justice Samuel 
Alito, writing for three other Justices and concurring in the judgment of the Court, 
stated that “the use of longer term GPS monitoring in investigations of most 
offenses impinges on expectations of privacy, . . . [and the Court] need not consider 
whether prolonged GPS monitoring in the context of investigations involving 
extraordinary offenses would similarly intrude on a constitutionally protected 
sphere of privacy.”141 
                                                                                                                 
 
 134. Id. at 273 (emphasis added). 
 135. 540 U.S. 419 (2004). 
 136. Id. at 425. 
 137. Id. at 427 (emphasis added) (quoting Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979)). 
Notably, in his dissent in Illinois v. Caballes, a case involving a narcotics-detection dog who 
altered as to the presence of marijuana in an automobile, Justice David Souter pointed out 
that the Court should not 
prejudge a claim of authority to detect explosives and dangerous chemical or 
biological weapons that might be carried by a terrorist who prompts no 
individualized suspicion. Suffice it to say here that what is a reasonable search 
depends in part on demonstrated risk. Unreasonable sniff searches for 
marijuana are not necessarily unreasonable sniff searches for destructive or 
deadly material if suicide bombs are a societal risk. 
543 U.S. 405, 417 n.7 (2005) (Souter, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
 138. 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). 
 139. Id. at 948. 
 140. Id. at 950 n.3 (“Where, as here, the Government obtains information by physically 
intruding on a constitutionally protected area, [a Fourth Amendment] search has undoubtedly 
occurred.”). 
 141. Id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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Justice Alito’s concurring opinion prompted Justice Scalia to write that Fourth 
Amendment distinctions based on the nature of the offense would introduce a 
“novelty into our jurisprudence” because “[t]here is no precedent for the 
proposition that whether a search has occurred depends on the nature of the crime 
being investigated.”142 However, Justice Alito’s view was shared by Justices Ruth 
Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, and Elena Kagan. Moreover, it was explicitly 
accepted by Justice Sonia Sotomayor. In her concurring opinion, Justice Sotomayor 
wrote that she “agree[d] with Justice ALITO that, at the very least, longer term 
GPS monitoring in investigations of most offenses impinges on expectations of 
privacy.”143 Thus, although Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court, the 
fact that five Justices have recently expressed the view that the Fourth Amendment 
should treat most offenses similarly, as opposed to all offenses, suggests that those 
Justices might agree with the central thesis of this Article—namely, that the Fourth 
Amendment should treat grave offenses differently, particularly when the 
government is trying to prevent massive destruction or the catastrophic loss of life. 
In the state courts, perhaps the most notable decision to express the view that 
gravity of future harm could justify a warrantless search on less than probable 
cause was People v. Sirhan.144 After Senator Robert F. Kennedy was assassinated, 
law enforcement officers in Los Angeles, California, believed that there might be a 
conspiracy afoot to kill other prominent government leaders, and they concluded 
that they needed to take “prompt action.”145 In upholding the warrantless search of 
the room occupied by Sirhan, who was later convicted of assassinating Senator 
Kennedy, the California Supreme Court took note of the gravity of the offense and 
the “effect on this nation if several more political assassinations had followed that 
of Senator Kennedy.”146 The court then upheld the warrantless search, even though 
there was only a “mere possibility” that there might be evidence.147 
Prior to Jones, the admittedly fleeting references to the role that gravity of the 
offense should play in a Fourth Amendment calculus prompted Jeffrey Bellin to 
observe that “[t]he bulk of Fourth Amendment doctrine is transsubstantive, either 
                                                                                                                 
 
 142. Id. at 954. The majority refrained from “rushing forward” to resolve this issue, which 
it called “thorny” and “vexing.” Id. But cf. Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1980 (2013) 
(approving the use of DNA testing as a post-arrest booking procedure for “serious” offenses). 
 143. 132 S. Ct. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
 144. 497 P.2d 1121 (Cal. 1972). 
 145. Id. at 1138–40.  
 146. Id. at 1140. 
 147. Id. Other state supreme courts have also discussed how the nature of the offense 
affects Fourth Amendment questions. E.g., Butler v. State, 829 S.W.2d 412, 414–15 (Ark. 
1992) (noting “an important factor to be considered when determining whether any exigency 
exists is the gravity of the underlying offense for which the arrest is being made.”); People v. 
Miller, 773 P.2d 1053, 1057 (Colo. 1989) (looking to whether “a grave offense is involved, 
particularly in a crime of violence” when determining whether sufficient exigency exists to 
justify a warrantless search of a home); Commonwealth v. Roland, 637 A.2d 269, 270 (Pa. 
1994) (acknowledging that the gravity of the offense is a factor in determining whether 
exigent circumstances exist to justify a warrantless search); State v. Smith, 199 P.3d 386, 
389 (Wash. 2009) (explaining that circumstances may be exigent if they satisfy a “totality of 
the situation” test which includes a factor described as “the gravity or violent nature of the 
offense with which the suspect is to be charged”). 
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by virtue of the Supreme Court’s explicit rejection of crime severity as a valid 
Fourth Amendment consideration, or the Court’s pointed omission of that 
consideration from its analysis.”148 On the other hand, in his multivolume Fourth 
Amendment treatise, Wayne R. LaFave says that it is “tempting to conclude that 
the seriousness of the offense should be a factor in the probable cause equation, and 
that therefore this sub rosa practice of taking the offense into account should be 
recognized and legitimated.”149 Carol Steiker echoes that sentiment, stating that 
such an approach may be precisely what the Framers had intended through the use 
of the term unreasonable.150 Akil Amar has written that it makes “intuitive sense to 
police officials and citizens alike: serious crimes and serious needs can justify more 
serious searches and seizures.”151 Amar further says that “[i]t would make little 
sense to insist on the same amount of probability regardless of the imminence of 
the harm, the intrusiveness of the search, the reason for the search, and so on.”152 
Ric Simmons believes that suspicionless searches in areas where individuals do not 
have diminished expectations of privacy could be upheld if the government simply 
agreed to forgo the use of the fruits of the searches in other prosecutions.153 While this 
bright-line rule154 clearly has merit, and the fact that an aggrieved person155 could 
                                                                                                                 
 
 148. Bellin, supra note 24, at 17. 
 149. 2 LAFAVE, supra note 29, § 3.2(a), at 38. Gravity of the harm was considered to be 
an important factor by the drafters of the Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure that 
was proposed in 1975. See 3 LAFAVE, supra note 29, § 6.5(d), at 576 (summarizing section 
260.5 of the 1975 Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure “to the effect that a 
warrantless search of premises may be undertaken upon reasonable cause to believe that 
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serious bodily harm, or substantial destruction of property”). 
 150. Carol S. Steiker, Second Thoughts About First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 820, 
824 (1994) (noting that unreasonable “positively invites constructions that change with 
changing circumstances”); see also Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250 (1991) (“The 
Fourth Amendment does not proscribe all [government-initiated] searches and seizures; it 
merely proscribes those which are unreasonable.”). 
 151. Amar, supra note 24, at 802; see also Simmons, supra note 13, at 895 (“[I]f police 
have twenty-four hours to find an atomic bomb that they know is hidden in one of a hundred 
houses, it would be reasonable for them to conduct suspicionless searches of each of those 
houses.”). Cf. Bellin, supra note 24, at 6 (arguing that judges should “incorporate the 
severity of the crime being investigated into determinations of constitutional 
reasonableness . . . [to] grant the government more leeway in investigations of the gravest 
offenses, while simultaneously enabling concrete limits on investigations of minor crimes”); 
Gould & Stern, supra note 24, at 777, 819–23 (2004) (“[T]raditional [Fourth Amendment] 
doctrine falls short in an age of threats unprecedented in their potential for harm.”); Stuntz, 
supra note 24, at 875 (discussing how “some crimes are worse than others . . . [and] the 
worst crimes are the most important ones to solve, the ones worth paying the largest price in 
intrusions on citizens’ liberty and privacy”). 
 152. Amar, supra note 24, at 784. 
 153. Simmons, supra note 13, at 916. 
 154. Id. at 884–88. 
 155. FISA defines an “aggrieved person” as “a person who is the target of an electronic 
surveillance or any other person whose communications or activities were subject to 
electronic surveillance.” 50 U.S.C. § 1801(k) (2012). Title III defines an “aggrieved person” 
as “a person who was a party to any intercepted wire, oral, or electronic communication or a 
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bring a civil rights lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 might serve as an ex ante 
check on the government’s conduct,156 these approaches do not, by themselves, 
sufficiently protect privacy. Moreover, as discussed in Part III, there are serious 
definitional issues that need to be resolved by the political branches of government, 
and failing to resolve those issues could lead, as Owen Fiss fears, to “great abuse,”157 
which could end up proving the adage that “hard cases make bad law.”158 
At the same time, any potential solution to the hypothetical must be workable 
and address the administrability concerns raised by the Supreme Court.159 
Moreover, the solution must be sufficiently flexible to enable the executive branch 
to respond to dynamic and potentially unpredictable circumstances.160 Government 
officials who are responsible for protecting the nation from terrorists seeking to 
cause massive destruction or a catastrophic loss of life need greater ex ante 
certainty that their preventative actions are constitutional.161 Thus, if there is to be a 
                                                                                                                 
person against whom the interception was directed.” 18 U.S.C. § 2510(11) (2012). 
 156. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 
397 (1971) (holding that “petitioner is entitled to recover money damages for any injuries he 
has suffered as a result of the agents’ violation of the [Fourth] Amendment”). However, the 
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led some lower courts to carve out exceptions related to national security. See Meshal v. 
Higgenbotham, No. 1:09–2178 (EGS), 2014 WL 2648032, at *12 (D.D.C. 2014) (“Under 
Lebron [v. Rumsfeld, 670 F.3d 540 (4th Cir. 2012)], Doe [v. Rumsfeld, 683 F.3d 390 (D.C. Cir. 
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violated in the context of military affairs, national security, or intelligence gathering Bivens is 
powerless to protect him.”). As a result, Steve Vladeck has concluded that there is a 
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Stephen I. Vladeck, The New National Security Canon, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 1295, 1328 (2012). 
 157. See Fiss, supra note 27, at 29. 
 158. Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400 (1904) (Holmes, J., 
dissenting). 
 159. E.g., Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 347 (2001) (noting that the 
Fourth Amendment needs “to be applied on the spur (and in the heat) of the moment” and 
that there is an “essential interest in readily administrable rules”); Michigan v. Summers, 452 
U.S. 692, 705 n.19 (1981) (suggesting police need “workable rules”); see Bellin, supra note 
24, at 21 (“[T]he few commentators who squarely address the subject sketch in exceedingly 
broad strokes, ultimately failing to address the Supreme Court's administrability concern.”). 
 160. See Kevin Johnson, Mueller’s Doomsday Scenario: Attack on Aircraft, USA TODAY, 
Aug. 23, 2013, at 5A (discussing the substantial challenges faced by the FBI including the 
“unpredictable nature of attackers acting alone”); see also Stew Magnuson, FBI Anticipates 
Terrorist Attacks on Soft Targets in the United States, NAT’L DEF. MAG., May 2011, at 14 
(“Soft targets are now a priority for terrorists determined to inflict damage in the United 
States.”); Scott Stewart, The Persistent Threat to Soft Targets, STRATFOR GLOBAL 
INTELLIGENCE (July 26, 2012, 4:04 AM), http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/persistent-threat
-soft-targets (discussing the evolving paradigm shift by terrorists from “hard” to “soft” targets). 
 161. See James A. Baker, Constitution Day Address at the Dickinson College Clarke 
Forum for Contemporary Issues: National Security and the Constitution (Sept. 12, 2013), at 
9, available at http://clarke.dickinson.edu/wp-content/uploads/Dickinson-Constitution-Day
-Talk-12-Sept-2013.pdf (“Our surveillance and privacy laws need an overhaul. For example, 
it is often still too difficult to figure out what is lawful and what is not. This negatively 
impacts both intelligence collection and privacy protection. Out of confusion, lawyers can 
say no when they should say yes, and yes when they should say no.”). 
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solution to the no-win scenario, it must include additional principles and measures 
beyond the previous discussions. As discussed below, a deep dive into the Fourth 
Amendment’s particularity requirement and minimization principles suggests a 
constitutional foundation upon which a new doctrinal solution to the hypothetical 
can be constructed. 
3. The Particularity Requirement 
As discussed earlier in the context of court-authorized wiretaps, particularity 
requires the judicial branch to approve the specific communications that the 
government may lawfully acquire.162 Yet, the Supreme Court has upheld a wiretap 
order that permitted the government to acquire virtually every communication that 
was taking place on a lawfully targeted device.163 How can we square that result 
with the particularity requirement? The answer lies in how courts apply 
minimization principles to the government’s conduct. 
When the government obtains the contents of telephone or e-mail 
communications, its conduct can be divided into three stages: the acquisition stage, 
which refers to the stage when the government obtains the communications in the 
first instance either through a monitoring or a recording device; the retention stage, 
which refers to the government’s ability to keep the communications it has initially 
obtained; and the dissemination stage, which refers to the government’s ability to 
share the communications.164 Minimization requires the government to reduce—to 
minimize—the amount of irrelevant information that it acquires, retains, and 
disseminates.165 For example, if the government was to target a suspected spy’s 
telephone, the government could acquire all of the communications that took place 
on that telephone, including when the spy’s wife used the telephone. If the 
government concludes that the spy’s wife is not involved in her husband’s 
clandestine intelligence activities, then the wife’s communications (though lawfully 
acquired) should be destroyed, as well as the spy’s communications that are 
irrelevant to his spying activities.166 Thus, minimization is typically viewed as a 
back-end requirement because, even though the executive branch may have taken 
“great care”167 when it initially acquired the communications, its conduct would 
                                                                                                                 
 
 162. See Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 56–57 (1967). 
 163. See Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 141–43 (1978).  
 164. See 1 DAVID S. KRIS & J. DOUGLAS WILSON, NATIONAL SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS & 
PROSECUTIONS § 9:1 (2d ed. 2012). 
 165. S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at 69 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2192–93. 
This minimization requirement has become an integral part of Title III. See 18 U.S.C. § 
2518(5) (2012). See generally 1 KRIS & WILSON, supra note 164, § 9:1, at 321–22 
(“Minimization governs the implementation of electronic surveillance and physical searches to 
ensure that they conform to their authorized purpose and scope, and requires the government to 
‘minimize’ the amount of irrelevant information that it acquires, retains, and disseminates.”). 
 166. S. REP. NO. 95-604, at 38 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3904, 3939. 
 167. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 354 (1967) (observing that the agents took 
“great care” to only overhear Katz’s conversations in the phone booth). 
24 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 90:1 
 
nonetheless run afoul of the Fourth Amendment if it did not “minimize[] 
unwarranted intrusions of privacy.”168 
The leading Supreme Court case to address minimization is Scott v. United 
States.169 In Scott, government agents were authorized to intercept virtually all of 
the telephone conversations that were made to or from a particular telephone.170 
Although the supporting affidavits in Scott named nine individuals involved in a 
narcotics conspiracy, the district court authorized the government to intercept the 
communications of those nine persons as well as “other persons [who] may make 
use of the facilities.”171 After the wiretap ended, twenty-two persons were arrested 
and before the trial, the defendants moved to suppress the evidence.172 Among 
other things, the defendants argued that the government failed to comply with its 
minimization obligations since the government intercepted virtually all of the 
communications but only minimized 40 percent of them.173 
In analyzing the reasonableness of the government’s conduct, the Supreme 
Court emphasized in Scott that it was important to consider the circumstances of 
the wiretap.174 The Court then noted that there should be no “inflexible rule,” and 
that “when an investigation is focusing on a widespread conspiracy, more extensive 
surveillance may be justified in an attempt to determine the precise scope of the 
enterprise.”175 For example, the Court noted that in the early stages of surveillance 
the government may need “to intercept all calls to establish categories of 
nonpertinent calls which will not be intercepted thereafter.”176 
Scott was not the first case in which the Supreme Court observed that 
minimization should be calibrated to the nature of harm being investigated. The 
Court had noted in Keith that national security surveillance is “often long range and 
involves the interrelation of various sources and types of information.”177 Thus, 
since some telephone calls may be ambiguous or involve guarded or coded 
language, the Court concluded in Scott that it would not be unreasonable under 
certain circumstances to intercept “almost every short conversation because the 
determination of relevancy cannot be made before the call is completed.”178 The 
federal courts of appeals have also observed that, as long as the government makes 
a “good faith effort to minimize . . . irrelevant information,” there is no prohibition 
                                                                                                                 
 
 168. Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 482 n.11 (1976) (In executing warrants that 
authorize “the ‘seizure’ of telephone conversations . . . responsible officials, including 
judicial officials, must take care to assure that they are conducted in a manner that minimizes 
unwarranted intrusions upon privacy.”). 
 169. 436 U.S. 128 (1978). 
 170. Id. at 130. 
 171. Id. at 131 (emphasis added). 
 172. Id. at 132.  
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. at 140. 
 175. Id. at 139–40 (emphasis added). 
 176. Id. at 141 (emphasis added). 
 177. United States v. U.S. Dist. Ct. (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 322 (1972). 
 178. Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. at 141 (emphasis added). 
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on the retention of “innocuous” communications that “may later turn out to be of 
great significance.”179 
The legislative branch has also previously concluded that the Fourth 
Amendment can tolerate the acquisition of irrelevant and even innocent 
communications in certain circumstances. At the time FISA was enacted in 1978, 
the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) noted in its report 
that the executive branch should not be required to make an “instantaneous 
identification” of communications that may contain valuable foreign intelligence 
information.180 Moreover, HPSCI stated in its report that there could be 
circumstances where the government may retain the communications of “innocent 
persons” to identify other individuals who may be involved in a wide-ranging and 
clandestine conspiracy that threatens the national security of the United States.181 
Finally, HPSCI stated in its report a view that was shared by the Senate Select 
Committee on Intelligence (SSCI)—namely, that in certain investigations, there could 
very well be “technological reasons” that would prevent minimization at the 
acquisition stage.182 Thus, as HPSCI and SSCI noted in each of their reports, in some 
cases, “it may not be possible or reasonable to avoid acquiring all conversations.”183 
The foregoing discussion shows that both the legislative and the judicial 
branches have concluded that the Fourth Amendment can tolerate the acquisition of 
all communications in certain circumstances provided that minimization takes place 
on the back end. Minimization principles therefore provide “sufficient latitude to 
meet Fourth Amendment particularity requirements.”184 Observing that these two 
branches have viewed minimization as a constitutionally acceptable method of 
balancing competing Fourth Amendment interests suggests the potential for a new 
                                                                                                                 
 
 179. United States v. Hammoud, 381 F.3d 316, 334 (4th Cir. 2004). Indeed, as the Court 
of Appeals for the Second Circuit has noted, Fourth Amendment reasonableness requires 
that the intrusion on privacy be weighed against the “government’s surveillance needs.” See 
In re Terrorist Bombings, 552 F.3d 157, 175 (2d Cir. 2008) (“Our balancing of these 
compelling, and competing, interests turns on whether the scope of the intrusion here was 
justified by the government’s surveillance needs.”). After examining a number of 
minimization factors, the Court found that the interception of all communications with an 
alleged terrorist was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment because even though privacy 
intrusion may have been “great, the need for the government to so intrude was even greater.” 
Id. at 176 (emphasis added). 
 180. H.R. REP. NO. 95-1283, pt. 1, at 58 (1978) (advising that it is permissible to retain 
and to a limited extent disseminate information in “bits and pieces before their full 
significance becomes apparent”); see also 1 KRIS & WILSON, supra note 164, § 11:10, at 414 
(“[U]nder FISA depending on the case, the recording devices may or may not be left on, and 
minimization occurs, among other places, in the process of indexing and logging the 
pertinent communications.”). 
 181. H.R. REP. NO. 95-1283, pt.1, at 58 (approving the acquisition and retention of the 
communications of a “large number of innocent persons . . . at least until it is determined that 
they are not involved in the clandestine intelligence activities”). 
 182. Id. at 55 (“[I]n many cases, it may not be possible for technical reasons to avoid 
acquiring all communications.”); S. REP. NO. 95-701, at 40 (1978), reprinted in 1978 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3973, 4009 (noting the technological impossibility of acquiring all situations). 
 183. H.R. REP. NO. 95-1283, pt. 1, at 56 (emphasis added). Accord S. REP. NO. 95-701, at 40. 
 184. 1 KRIS & WILSON, supra note 164, § 11:6, at 408. 
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doctrinal solution to the no-win scenario—namely, that the Fourth Amendment’s 
particularity requirement could be satisfied in the context of the hypothetical by 
moving minimization from the back end to the front end. In other words, in certain 
circumstances, post-interception minimization could satisfy what would normally 
be a pre-interception particularity requirement. 
The question, however, is whether such a “marginal adjustment”185 should be 
made every time the government seeks to prevent a potentially grave consequence, 
or only in a limited and carefully delineated186 set of catastrophic consequences. 
Here, our hypothetical looks at the threatened use of a WMD. Part II will therefore 
provide an overview of four different types of WMDs and the different 
consequences that can be reasonably anticipated from their respective use. 
II. WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION 
In May 2010, President Barack Obama stated in a national security strategy 
report that there was “no greater threat to the American people than weapons of 
mass destruction, particularly the danger posed by the pursuit of nuclear weapons 
by violent extremists and their proliferation to additional states.”187 Although some 
believe that terrorists may be more focused on the acquisition and use of 
conventional weapons rather than WMDs,188 one expert has identified a number 
of reasons why a violent extremist group may wish to use a WMD, including: 
(a) the psychological impact that such a weapon would have on the American 
public; (b) the economic, political, and social instability that would reasonably 
be expected to follow the use of a WMD; (c) the physical destruction that 
could be caused to critical infrastructure, loss of life, and contamination to 
vital areas; (d) the “state-like” prestige that a terrorist group perceives it would 
receive from the use of a WMD; (e) a “fetishistic predisposition” toward the use 
of a WMD; (f) defensive aggression if the group perceived its own destruction 
was imminent; or (g) the group’s need to outdo destruction that was caused by 
another group.189 Terrorists who are motivated by religious beliefs and seek 
                                                                                                                 
 
 185. See RICHARD A. POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT: THE CONSTITUTION IN A TIME OF 
EMERGENCY 1 (2006) (explaining “the marginal adjustments in [constitutional] rights that 
practical-minded judges make when the values that underlie the rights—values such as 
personal liberty and privacy—come into conflict with values of equal importance, such as 
public safety, suddenly magnified by the onset of a national emergency”). 
 186. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). 
 187. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 4 (2010), available 
at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf. 
Former President George W. Bush issued a similar warning in 2002. See EXEC. OFFICE OF 
THE PRESIDENT, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY at v (2002), available at 
www.state.gov/documents/organization/63562.pdf (“The gravest danger our Nation faces 
lies at the crossroads of radicalism and technology. Our enemies have openly declared that 
they are seeking weapons of mass destruction, and evidence indicates that they are doing so 
with determination.”). 
 188. See Rachel Oswald, Despite WMD Fears, Terrorists Still Focused on Conventional 
Attacks, GLOBAL SECURITY NEWSWIRE (Apr. 17, 2013), http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/despite
-wmd-fears-terrorists-still-focused-conventional-attacks/. 
 189. See Nuclear Terrorism Hearing, supra note 3, at 2–3 (statement of Gary Anthony 
2015] THE FOURTH AMENDMENT’S “NO-WIN” SCENARIO 27 
 
“fundamental changes in the existing order” may also be far more willing to engage 
in “large-scale violence” and attacks involving mass casualties.190 
Any discussion concerning the threatened use of a WMD, however, needs to 
take into account that WMDs “differ sharply in character and in their effects.”191 
Indeed, one expert cautions that there are “broad differences in the lethality of each 
type of weapon,” and contrary to conventional wisdom, “[t]here is no reason to 
assume that [the] effect[] of [a] WMD should be measured in terms of mass 
casualties or mass destruction.”192 In June of 2009, the Department of Defense 
adopted the following definition of a WMD: “chemical, biological, radiological, 
and nuclear weapons capable of a high order of destruction or mass casualties.”193 
Accordingly, in order to provide a baseline for a discussion about WMDs, Part II 
focuses on chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons, as well as the 
anticipated consequences that could flow from the use of each of these weapons.194 
A. Chemical Weapons 
Chemical weapons are some of the oldest weapons to be considered weapons of 
mass destruction.195 For example, toxic fumes were reportedly used as a weapon in 
India as far back as 2000 BC.196 It was the scientific revolution of the late 
nineteenth century, however, that gave chemicals the potential to become major 
weapons of war.197 
Chemical weapons may exist as solids, gases, or liquids and their effects can be 
immediate and deadly. For example, through breathing, ingestion, or skin contact, 
chemical weapons can adversely affect the nervous system and the blood system, 
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which can lead to choking or blisters.198 Blister agents, such as mustard gas, are 
“oily liquids that inflict chemical burns on the skin or any other part of the body 
with which they come into contact, including the lungs if they are inhaled.”199 On 
the other hand, blood agents, such as cyanide, refer to chemical agents that 
“achieve their effects by traveling through the blood stream to sites where the agent 
can interfere with oxygen utilization at the cellular level.”200 Similarly, choking 
agents, such as chlorine, “attack the airways and cause swelling and edema in the 
lung tissues.”201 Nerve agents, such as sarin gas, “inhibit the function of vital 
enzymes in the human body,” and experts consider them to be the “most widely 
feared category of chemical weapon because of the speed and severity of their 
impact.”202 Finally, incapacitating agents, which also act upon the central nervous 
system and affect consciousness, memory, problem solving, attention, and 
comprehension, generally are not lethal, and instead “disable the target personnel 
for hours if not days after exposure.”203  
The “effects of chemical weapons are normally seen over a smaller area [than 
their nuclear and biological counterparts], and they have been traditionally viewed 
as more effective at the tactical or operational level rather than at the strategic 
level.”204 Moreover, “in contrast to biological weapons, which are . . . slow-acting, 
the effects of exposure to chemical weapons can become apparent within minutes 
or at most hours of initial contact.”205 Since “[l]arge amounts of [chemical] agents 
are required to achieve high lethality,”206 unless chemical weapons are being used 
by a nation state,207 their strategic value for a terrorist group with limited resources 
may derive more from their potential to cause a psychological impact than from 
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their ability to cause mass casualties, as terrorists seek to frighten populations and 
military units.208 
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that while the effects that flow from the use of 
chemical weapons can be assessed fairly quickly, their lethality can vary if the 
resources and delivery mechanisms that are available are limited. As discussed 
below, the fact that chemical weapons vary significantly in their effects raises 
critical issues directly tied to how the reasonableness question in the hypothetical 
should be resolved.209 
B. Biological Weapons 
From smallpox to bubonic plague, humanity has faced numerous naturally 
occurring diseases that “evoke images of horror and suffering.”210 As a result of 
their “ability to cause pervasive mortality, naturally occurring diseases have been 
used as weapons of war and terror for thousands of years.”211  
Generally speaking, biological weapons are infectious agents that “are produced 
from pathogenic microorganisms or [other] toxic substances of biological origin . . . 
[which] are capable of disabling and/or killing people, crops, and livestock.”212 In 
addition to smallpox, some of the more well-known types of biological weapons 
include anthrax, salmonella, ebola, and ricin.213  
In contrast to chemical weapons, which can produce immediate effects, because 
“most biological weapons consist of living organisms, symptoms will occur only 
after an incubation period that may last days to weeks.”214 Moreover, the initial 
symptoms from the use of biological weapons may very well appear as the 
“common cold or influenza and might be mistaken for a normal outbreak of 
infectious disease.”215 In the absence of a specific intelligence-driven threat stream 
or a claim of responsibility, detecting a biological terrorist attack may require 
reports of illness or death from a large number of persons, which can be 
particularly difficult to parse during the cold and flu season.216 
The Centers for Disease Control categorize biological weapons according to 
lethality, dividing them into three categories. Category A agents include organisms 
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that pose “a high risk to national security because they can be easily disseminated 
or transmitted person to person; result in high mortality rates. . . [;] have the 
potential for major public health impact; might cause public panic and social 
disruption; and require special action for public health preparedness.”217 Category 
B agents can lead to moderate illness rates and low death rates.218 Lastly, Category 
C agents have a potential for high illness and death rates because they “could be 
engineered for mass dissemination.”219 
One expert has observed that some biological weapons “offer a means of attack 
that is potentially cheap, lethal, and hard to detect.”220 The most effective means of 
distributing a biological weapon is in the form of a dry or wet aerosol, which 
typically is a “cloud of solid particles suspended in the air.”221 Although other 
means of delivery may include cluster bombs, artillery shells, rockets, and 
sophisticated sprayers, the use of large-scale delivery systems is thought to be 
associated with the military development of biological weapons.222 Other 
nontechnical and less expensive delivery mechanisms include human self-infection 
or the use of animal vectors, improvised crop-dusting airplanes, small backpack 
sprayers, or purse-sized atomizers.223 
Some biological weapons can be highly inefficient because they largely depend, 
in the case of open air delivery mechanisms, on “meteorological and terrain 
conditions such as wind velocity, temperature, precipitation, and humidity.”224 
Indeed, “[o]nly a small number of the hundreds of bacteria and viruses are viable as 
terrorist weapons; most cannot survive outside of narrow margins of temperature 
range or are too rare or hard to grow.”225 In addition, “[m]ost wet agents degrade 
quickly, although spores, dry encapsulated agents, and some toxins are persistent.”226 
Contaminating food and water supplies on a large scale would therefore pose 
challenges to terrorists because of the quality control processes that exist in the 
food supply chain. Moreover, one expert notes that terrorists who rely on biological 
weapons have to contend “with incremental degradation over time due to 
transporting materials from the point of acquisition or production to the point of 
use, not to mention ensuring [that] a suitably virulent strain has been properly and 
effectively weaponized.”227 
The effectiveness of biological weapons is also dependent on factors such as 
“choice of agent, type of formulation, and the manufacturing process employed.”228 
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One expert cautions, however, that while many biological weapons would likely result 
in low mortality rates, some biological weapons could be far more lethal than chemical 
weapons.229 The widespread use of certain agents, such as small pox or plague, could 
lead to widespread morbidity and mortality, as well as the “specter of enforced 
quarantine.”230 In addition, “the lack of a discreet endpoint . . . [could further] heighten 
the psychological effects on the targeted population.”231 Thus, biological attacks can 
cascade into “high-levels of anxiety, widespread fear, and perhaps even paranoia, 
leading to self-isolation . . . and social disruption to civil society.”232 
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the effects that flow from the use of 
biological weapons cannot be assessed as quickly as the effects that flow from the 
use of chemical weapons, and their lethality can vary significantly depending on a 
variety of factors. This variation, as discussed below, raises critical issues directly 
tied to how the Fourth Amendment should resolve the question of what types of 
searches are reasonable in the face of threatened use of a biological weapon.233 
C. Radiological Weapons 
Radiological weapons, which are a relatively new category of WMDs, are 
weapons that contain large amounts of ionizing radiation.234 If ingested or inhaled 
in sizeable amounts, ionizing radiation can lead to radiation sickness or cancer.235 
Radiological weapons can range from “crude explosive devices to sophisticated 
dispersal mechanisms.”236 Although radiological weapons can take many forms, 
one expert cautions that a radiological weapon should “not be confused with a 
nuclear weapon, and the effects of the two weapons differ greatly.”237 For example, 
radiological weapons can consist of more conventional explosives, such as 
dynamite, attached to some type of radioactive material.238 However, the resulting 
blast from such a weapon—the so-called dirty bomb—would “do a very poor job at 
effectively spreading out radioactive material in ways that can do serious harm to 
health or result in significant radioactive contamination that is hard to clean up.”239 
One expert believes that “for most scenarios involving radiological weapons, . . . 
few, if any, people near the scene of an attack would succumb to serious and 
immediate health effects.”240 “To experience these effects, individuals would have 
to receive relatively high exposures of ionizing radiation[,]”241 and even then it 
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could take upwards of decades for cancer to develop after exposure. Thus, while 
the “psychological and social consequences of a radiological attack could linger for 
years,” a radiological weapon “cannot produce a nuclear chain reaction and will 
not, consequently, result in a massive explosion.”242 
The lethality of radiological weapons can therefore be indeterminate “because of 
the time required to accumulate a disabling or significant dose of radiation through 
ingestion, inhalation, or exposure.”243 On the other hand, since radiation destroys 
human cells, and radiation poisoning can cause untreated victims to dehydrate and 
bleed to death, some radiological weapons, even in minute quantities, can be deadly.244 
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the effects that flow from the use of 
radiological weapons can vary. As a result, radiological weapons may be more 
suitable for “terror, political, and area denial purposes, rather than for mass 
killings.”245 As discussed below, this raises critical issues directly tied to how the 
Fourth Amendment reasonableness question should be resolved.246 
D. Nuclear Weapons 
More than any other WMD that could be used by a terrorist, a nuclear weapon 
would “represent a ‘game-changing’ event far exceeding the impact of 9/11.”247 
“Nuclear weapons draw their explosive force from fission, fusion, or a combination 
of these two methods.”248 While one expert believes that a fusion-based nuclear 
weapon would be “too sophisticated for fabrication” by terrorists, and while 
fissionable materials exist only in very minute quantities, purchasing, stealing, or 
otherwise obtaining highly enriched types of uranium, plutonium, or similar 
materials would enable terrorists with sophisticated knowledge and expertise to 
make an improvised nuclear device.249 
The energy that results from a nuclear weapon is generally grouped into five 
effects: (1) blast effects, (2) thermal effects, (3) radiation effects, 
(4) electromagnetic effects, and (5) climate effects.250 A nuclear weapon could be 
detonated in the air, at either low or high altitudes, underwater, underground, or on 
the surface of the planet.251 Depending upon the size of the weapon (frequently 
                                                                                                                 
 
 242. Id. at 174. 
 243. CORDESMAN, supra note 191, at 194. 
 244. Ferguson, supra note 234, at 185. 
 245. CORDESMAN, supra note 191, at 194. 
 246. See infra Parts IV and V. 
 247. Nuclear Terrorism Hearing, supra note 3, at 1 (statement of Gary Anthony 
Ackerman, Research Director, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and 
Responses to Terrorism). 
 248. Charles P. Blair, Jihadists and Nuclear Weapons, in JIHADISTS AND WEAPONS OF 
MASS DESTRUCTION, supra note 195, at 193, 195. 
 249. Id. at 195–203. 
 250. See Effects of Nuclear Weapons, NUCLEAR DARKNESS, GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE & 
NUCLEAR FAMINE: THE DEADLY CONSEQUENCES OF NUCLEAR WAR, 
http://www.nucleardarkness.org/nuclear/effectsofnuclearweapons/. 
 251. See John Pike, Nuclear Weapon Effects, FED’N OF AM. SCIENTISTS (Oct. 21, 1998, 4:35 
PM), http://www.fas.org/nuke/intro/nuke/effects.htm. See generally SAMUEL GLASSTONE 
& PHILIP J. DOLAN, THE EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (3d ed. 1977). 
2015] THE FOURTH AMENDMENT’S “NO-WIN” SCENARIO 33 
 
expressed in terms of kilotons and yield), the location of the blast, and the 
characteristics of the environment, everything in the immediate vicinity of “ground 
zero”252—the point on the Earth's surface closest to the point of a nuclear 
detonation—would vaporize from the initial blast.253 A fireball would then 
immediately rise, expand, and cool, giving the appearance of a mushroom cloud.254 
The blast would also produce a shock wave and “vaporized matter [would] 
condense [into] a cloud containing solid particles of weapon debris” contaminated 
by radioactivity, which would disperse over a vast area.255 A high-altitude nuclear 
detonation could also produce an electromagnetic pulse, resulting in a sudden burst 
of electromagnetic radiation that could have catastrophic and devastating effects to 
critical infrastructures for power, transportation, telecommunications, banking, 
finance, food, and water.256 
The detonation of a nuclear WMD would, therefore, lead to short-term as well as 
long-term physical, health, environmental, social, and psychological effects. Those 
effects would be felt in varying degrees based on a number of factors, including 
distance from the point of the blast.257 Since the detonation of a single nuclear 
weapon could produce massive destruction and loss of life on an unimaginable 
scale,258 it truly qualifies as the most devastating weapon of mass destruction. 
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III. DEFINITIONAL ISSUES 
At this point, it is appropriate to restate the hypothetical and further highlight 
why it matters that different consequences can reasonably be anticipated from the 
use of different WMDs. In our hypothetical, a reliable informant has told the 
government that a highly skilled terrorist, has entered the United States and is 
assembling a WMD at a safe house sometime within the next thirty to forty-five 
days. The government does not know the precise location of the terrorist or the 
specific telephone or e-mail account that is being used by him, but the informant is 
80 percent certain that the safe house is located somewhere in Georgetown, fewer 
than two miles from the White House.259 Finding and preventing the terrorist from 
using the WMD is clearly the paramount goal for the government.260 
Noticeably absent from the fact pattern, however, is the specific type of WMD 
that is being assembled. This point is critical. As discussed in Part II, the use of 
different types of WMDs can lead to different consequences. This point takes on 
exceptional importance because a close examination of U.S. law reveals significant 
definitional issues. Indeed, as the Congressional Research Service has noted, the 
“term ‘WMD’ is problematic from an analytic perspective . . . [because it] implies 
that [these weapons] are similar even though each type differs greatly from the 
others in its mechanisms and effects,”261 and because, as discussed below, the 
definition under U.S. law could include a more conventional weapon. For example, 
in the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994,262 Congress 
defined a WMD broadly to include chemical, biological, and radiological weapons, 
as well as “any destructive device as defined in section 921 of this title.”263 
Reference to section 921 is particularly challenging from the perspective of the 
hypothetical because it defines the term “destructive device” to mean: 
any explosive, incendiary, or poison gas—(i) bomb, (ii) grenade, (iii) 
rocket having a propellant charge of more than four ounces, (iv) missile 
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having an explosive or incendiary charge of more than one-quarter 
ounce, (v) mine, or (vi) device similar to any of the devices described 
in the preceding clauses.264 
FISA’s WMD definition adds further complexity to the discussion. Under FISA, 
a WMD includes “any explosive, incendiary, or poison gas device that is designed, 
intended, or has the capability to cause a mass casualty incident.”265 On the other 
hand, the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996 uses a 
different measurement of consequence.266 Instead of referencing a “mass casualty 
incident,” this statute defines WMD as “any weapon or device that is intended, or 
has the capability, to cause death or serious bodily injury to a significant number of 
people through the release, dissemination, or impact of—(A) toxic or poisonous 
chemicals or their precursors; (B) a disease organism; or (C) radiation or 
radioactivity.”267 
As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, the failure of the hypothetical to 
specify the type of WMD is critical. While the media may understand or represent 
WMDs as a “monolithic menace,”268 members of the legislative branch, as the 
elected representatives of the people, have an essential role to play in making 
“intellectually rigorous distinctions”269 among different types of WMDs before we 
can assess whether, and the degree to which, consequence should matter. Once 
those definitional challenges are resolved, however, the question then turns to 
whether in a particular case, it would be reasonable to move minimization from the 
back end to the front end to satisfy the Fourth Amendment’s particularity 
requirement. Part IV therefore explores an analytical framework that may be used 
in assessing the role of consequence in particular sets of circumstances. 
 
                                                                                                                 
 
 264. 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(4)(A)(i)–(vi) (2012). In addition to these explosive, incendiary, 
or poison gas devices, section 921 defines a “destructive device” to include the following: 
“any type of weapon (other than a shotgun or a shotgun shell which the Attorney General 
finds is generally recognized as particularly suitable for sporting purposes) by whatever 
name known which will, or which may be readily converted to, expel a projectile by the 
action of an explosive or other propellant, and which has any barrel with a bore of more than 
one-half inch in diameter.” Id. § 921(a)(4)(B). 
 265. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(p) (Supp. 2014) (emphasis added). 
 266. 50 U.S.C. § 2302(1) (2012). 
 267. Id. (emphasis added). Dr. Seth Carus, Deputy Director and Distinguished Research 
Fellow at the National Defense University, has compiled these differences under U.S. law, 
and he has also pointed out that twenty-two states have laws that contain WMD definitions 
and that a number of different WMD definitions also appear in international law. See Carus, 
supra note 193, Appendix C–D.  
 268. SUSAN D. MOELLER, CTR. FOR INT’L AND SEC. STUDIES AT MD., MEDIA COVERAGE OF 
WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION 3 (2004), available at http://www.cissm.umd.edu/papers
/files/wmdstudy_full.pdf. 
 269. Carus, supra note 193, at 47. An overly broad statutory definition of a weapon of 
mass destruction may also affect the “usual constitutional balance of federal and state 
powers.” Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2089 (2014) (finding that the federal 
chemical weapons statute does not apply to the defendant’s conduct). 
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IV. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT’S PROTECTIVE LENS AND THE 
PROBABILITY CONSEQUENCE MATRIX 
A number of scholars have written about the importance of adopting readings of 
the Constitution that preserve its original values.270 The underlying values of the 
Fourth Amendment, which are “basic to a free society,”271 include the “protect[ion] 
of personal privacy . . . against unwarranted intrusion by the State.”272 A person 
who places a private telephone call is “entitled to assume that the words he utters 
into the mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the world.”273 The same can be said of 
private e-mail communications.274 Indeed, unless the government’s ability to 
intercept communications is checked, wiretapping devices pose a real and 
significant threat to liberty.275 
However, as discussed earlier, it is essential not to confuse the reasonable 
expectation of privacy test, which enables us to determine whether a search has 
occurred, with the separate question of whether a search is reasonable. Amar 
reminds us that, in sorting through Fourth Amendment questions, we cannot 
abandon common sense and must find constitutional reasonableness.276 The 
Supreme Court itself has stated that the Fourth Amendment does not protect against 
“all intrusions . . . but against intrusions which are not justified in the 
circumstances, or which are made in an improper manner.”277  
Thus, reasonableness should not be assessed in a vacuum and without 
consideration of the government’s interest. Fourth Amendment reasonableness 
should be viewed contextually and assessed under particular facts and 
circumstances. In the context of the threatened use of certain WMDs, it is hard to 
imagine a governmental interest more compelling than the preservation and 
protection of society from existential threats, massive destruction, or catastrophic 
loss of life, which is clearly a constitutional value of the “highest order of 
magnitude.”278 Indeed, Article IV of the Constitution imposes an affirmative 
obligation on the federal government to protect the nation.279 
                                                                                                                 
 
 270. E.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 165, 222 (1999). 
 271. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949). 
 272. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966). 
 273. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967). 
 274. See United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 288 (6th Cir. 2010). The Sixth Circuit 
also observed, however, that in some cases, subscriber agreements might be “sweeping enough 
to defeat a reasonable expectation of privacy in the content of an email account.” Id. at 286. 
 275. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 63 (1967). 
 276. See Amar, supra note 24, at 802–06. 
 277. See Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1969 (2013) (quoting Schmerber v. 
California, 384 U.S. 757, 768 (1966)). 
 278. In re Directives Pursuant to Section 105B of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Act, 551 F.3d 1004, 1012 (Foreign Int. Surv. Ct. Rev. 2008); see also Haig v. Agee, 453 
U.S. 280, 307 (1981). 
 279. See U.S. CONST., art. IV, § 4 (“The United States shall guarantee to every State in 
this Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against 
Invasion . . . .”); see also Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 611–12 (1985) (“Few 
interests can be more compelling than a nation’s need to ensure its own security. . . . Unless 
society has the capability and will to defend itself from the aggressions of others, 
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The Constitution requires consideration of all of these values and leads to a 
number of key questions when a suspected terrorist threatens to use a WMD: first, 
how can we reconcile these seemingly competing values—individual privacy and 
an extraordinarily compelling government interest—so that they are mutually 
reinforcing and not mutually exclusive; and, second, who gets to decide how we 
should reconcile them?280 Layered on top of these questions are additional 
considerations. As noted earlier, in a crisis involving a specific and credible threat 
by a terrorist to use a WMD, government officials should have greater ex ante 
certainty in regard to the constitutionality of their preventative actions.281 
Moreover, any new doctrinal solution must be appropriately flexible to enable 
those government officials to adapt to what may be dynamic or unpredictable 
circumstances. Finally, as Bellin has cautioned, solutions must be workable and 
address the Supreme Court’s administrability concerns.282  
I have previously written about the importance of using the correct lens to 
analyze Fourth Amendment issues.283 “The ‘lens’ method of analysis is based on 
the premise that one has a better chance of arriving at the correct [analytical] result 
only if one begins the analysis with the correct lens.”284 Here, the correct lens to 
apply is the Fourth Amendment’s protective lens, which looks to consequence as a 
constitutionally appropriate factor in assessing whether the government’s conduct 
is reasonable.285 Notwithstanding our stipulation that expectations of privacy would 
be at their zenith with respect to the government’s acquisition of the content of 
telephone and e-mail communications, it is simply not acceptable to conclude that 
the Constitution abides no solution to the hypothetical. Indeed, as Russell Covey 
has observed, “The gravity of the threat posed by WMD, made or hidden in private 
residences, suggests that a Fourth Amendment jurisprudence that constructs a 
                                                                                                                 
constitutional protections of any sort have little meaning.”); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. 
v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 662 (1952) (Clark, J., concurring) (“In my view . . . 
the Constitution does grant to the President extensive authority in times of grave and 
imperative national emergency. In fact, to my thinking, such a grant may well be necessary 
to the very existence of the Constitution itself.”); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 37 
(1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (“There is danger that, if the Court does not temper its 
doctrinaire logic with a little practical wisdom, it will convert the constitutional Bill of 
Rights into a suicide pact.”). See generally Charles L. Black, Jr., Mr. Justice Black, the 
Supreme Court, and the Bill of Rights, HARPER’S MAG., Feb. 1961, at 63, 68 (arguing 
justifications that are put forward for infringing the Bill of Rights should not be ignored 
when they arise from an “altogether different order of magnitude”). 
 280. See Stuntz, supra note 24, at 875 (“[S]olutions to hard problems can never be found 
unless the system grapples with the right questions. That is the central problem with Fourth 
Amendment law as it stands today: it fails to ask the right questions.”). 
 281. See Baker, supra note 161, at 9–10. 
 282. See Bellin, supra note 24, at 21 (“[T]he few commentators who squarely address the 
subject sketch in exceedingly broad strokes, ultimately failing to address the Supreme 
Court's administrability concern.”). 
 283. See Glick, supra note 26, at 124. 
 284. Id. 
 285. See supra notes 104–52 and accompanying text. 
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relatively impermeable wall around the home or any other ‘constitutionally-
protected area’ is imprudent and potentially disastrous.”286 
In thinking about a path towards a constitutional solution to the hypothetical, it 
is important to precisely examine where the tension arises. By any measure, based 
upon the information provided by a reliable informant, the government’s 
information with respect to the terrorist’s conduct is well beyond the minimum 
threshold set by the Supreme Court with respect to probable cause.287 However, in 
addition to not knowing the type of WMD that is being assembled, the other critical 
piece of information missing from the hypothetical is the identification of the 
particular communication device that the terrorist is using. If we lived in a world in 
which there were only cellular telephones and there was only one cell tower288 that 
transmitted all cellular telephone calls to and from Georgetown, or a world in 
which there was only one router289 through which all of the Internet traffic in 
Georgetown flowed, then arguably, the constitutional tension in the hypothetical 
would not exist.290 Clearly, however, we live in a world in which there are 
numerous cell towers, Internet routers, and landline telephones, any of which could 
be carrying the terrorist’s communications. The questions can then be restated as 
follows: using the Fourth Amendment’s protective lens, is there any framework 
                                                                                                                 
 
 286. Russell D. Covey, Pervasive Surveillance and the Future of the Fourth Amendment, 
80 MISS. L.J. 1289, 1300 (2011); see also Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 
U.S. 656, 675 n.3 (1989) (“As Judge Friendly explained in a leading case upholding [airport 
security screening] searches: ‘When the risk is the jeopardy to hundreds of human lives and 
millions of dollars of property inherent in the pirating or blowing up of a large airplane, that 
danger alone meets the test of reasonableness . . . .’” (emphasis in original) (quoting United 
States v. Edwards, 498 F.2d 496, 500 (2d Cir. 1974))). 
 287. See supra notes 46–55 and accompanying text. 
 288. Cell towers, sometimes referred to as cell sites, are the physical locations at which 
the antennas and associated electronic equipment that are used for transmitting wireless 
telephone communications are placed. See HARRY NEWTON, NEWTON’S TELECOM 
DICTIONARY 265 (Steve Schoen ed., 26th ed. 2011). “Cell sites may be located on 
stand-alone towers or on top of pre-existing buildings,” Susan Freiwald, Cell Phone 
Location Data and the Fourth Amendment: A Question of Law, Not Fact, 70 MD. L. REV. 
681, 683 n.10 (2011), and whenever a user places or receives a voice call (or sends or 
receives a text message), the radio portion of that communication is transmitted between the 
customer’s handset and a nearby tower. Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) 
(Part II): Geolocation Privacy and Surveillance: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, 
Terrorism, Homeland Sec., and Investigations of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th 
Cong. 6–7 (2013) (statement of Mark Eckenwiler, Senior Counsel, Perkins Coie LLP). See 
generally, Marshall Brain, Jeff Tyson & Julia Layton, How Cell Phones Work, HOW STUFF 
WORKS, (Nov. 14, 2000), http://electronics.howstuffworks.com/cell-phone.htm. 
 289. See Frequently Asked Questions, INTERNET TRAFFIC REPORT, 
http://www.internettrafficreport.com/faq.htm#router (“Routers are traffic cop computers on 
[the] Internet . . . [that are] responsible for redirecting data from sender to receiver. When 
major routers slow down or stop, it has an adverse affect [sic] on Internet data flow in that 
region.”). See generally BARBARA VAN SCHEWICK, INTERNET ARCHITECTURE AND 
INNOVATION 84 (2010) (“The Internet . . . connects different physical networks using a set of 
conventions that let computers attached to these networks communicate.”). 
 290. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-1283, pt. 1, at 55–56 (1978) (“[W]here a switchboard line is 
tapped . . . it may not be possible or reasonable to avoid acquiring all conversations.”). 
2015] THE FOURTH AMENDMENT’S “NO-WIN” SCENARIO 39 
 
that could be used to solve the no-win scenario? And what role is played by the 
type of WMD to be deployed? 
One potential framework would be to use a probability consequence matrix. For 
purposes of this discussion, let us assume that there are two variables in this 
matrix—probability and consequence—and within those variables, at least in the 
matrix’s simplest form, let us further assume that there are two categories: high and 
low. When there is a high probability of a high consequence WMD being deployed, 
we should use minimization as a front-end substitute for the Fourth Amendment’s 
particularity requirement. On the other hand, when there is a low or a high 
probability of only a low consequence WMD being deployed, then perhaps we 
should not rely on minimization to satisfy the particularity requirement. Such reliance 
would arguably be, in Fourth Amendment parlance, unreasonable. See below. 
Table 1.  The probability consequence matrix 
 Low Probability High Probability 
Low Consequence No No 
High Consequence ?? Yes 
Concluding that minimization on the front end can serve as a substitute for the 
Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement in a limited and carefully delineated 
set of circumstances does not completely solve the “no-win” scenario. As 
illustrated above, the most difficult circumstance to resolve is where there is a low 
probability of a high consequence attack. One day, technology may provide a 
solution.291 Until then, the probability consequence matrix can provide an analytical 
framework for policymakers to debate the issues. It should be recognized, however, 
that the range of potential circumstances will likely result in a more complex matrix 
because probability and consequence should be viewed in the WMD context as a 
sliding scale. 
With respect to high probability/high consequence events, however, additional 
steps must be taken by both the executive branch and the judicial branch to ensure 
that individual privacy rights are protected and the government’s conduct is 
appropriately cabined. These steps must include specific minimization procedures. 
Drawing upon FISA’s definition, the procedures should “minimize the acquisition 
and retention, and prohibit the dissemination, of nonpublicly available information 
concerning United States persons consistent with the need” to protect against the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 291. To the extent that voice-to-text transcription technology for wire communications 
evolves in the future to a point at which automated processes can accurately screen the 
content of the communications, the use of such technology, coupled with minimization on 
the front end, would prevent any human observation of the content of the communications. 
Compare Ads in Gmail, GOOGLE, https://support.google.com/mail/answer/6603?hl=en (“Ad 
targeting in Gmail is fully automated, and no humans read your email or Google Account 
information in order to show you advertisements or related information.”), with Orin S. Kerr, 
Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 HARV. L. REV. 531, 535 (2005) (arguing that 
a Fourth Amendment search is best described as the process by which “data is exposed to 
human observation”). 
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specific WMD threat.292 Among other things, live monitoring should take place, 
and as soon as the government determines that it has targeted a communication 
device that is not being used by the terrorist or one of his co-conspirators, the 
government should cease to target that device, and all previously acquired 
communications from that device should be destroyed. Such procedures should also 
require the government to promptly notify the court if further intelligence or 
investigative activity allows it to narrow the ongoing surveillance. 
Resolving the constitutional tension present in the hypothetical therefore 
requires the executive branch to submit narrowly tailored and specifically designed 
minimization procedures to the judicial branch for approval, and requires the 
judicial branch to closely oversee the executive branch throughout the surveillance 
period in order to hold the delicate balance between competing constitutional 
values “steady and true.”293 However, the solution also requires the legislative 
branch to resolve the definitional issues highlighted by Parts II and III; moreover, 
other important steps must also be taken. Part V discusses these additional steps. 
V. A PATH FORWARD 
The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that “the ultimate touchstone of 
the Fourth Amendment is ‘reasonableness’”294 and “particularized exceptions . . . 
are sometimes warranted.”295 The hypothetical raises competing constitutional 
values: the protection of individual privacy on the one hand, and the preservation 
and protection of society from existential threats, massive destruction, or 
catastrophic loss of life, on the other hand. The Fourth Amendment should not, 
however, paralyze the judicial branch and leave the nation “stuck in a zero-sum 
world,”296 particularly when the legislative branch can play an important 
                                                                                                                 
 
 292. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(h) (2012) (definition of minimization procedures); cf. 50 U.S.C. 
§ 1801(e)(1)(A)–(B) (2012) (definition of foreign intelligence information). 
 293. See In re Directives Pursuant to Section 105B of the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act, 551 F.3d 1004, 1016 (Foreign Int. Surv. Ct. Rev. 2008) (“[T]he 
Constitution is the cornerstone of our freedoms, and the government cannot unilaterally 
sacrifice constitutional rights on the altar of national security. Thus, in carrying out its 
national security mission, the government must simultaneously fulfill its constitutional 
responsibility to provide reasonable protections for the privacy of United States persons. The 
judiciary’s duty is to hold that delicate balance steady and true.”). 
 294. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2482 (2014) (quoting Brigham City v. Stuart, 
547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006)); Michigan v. Fisher, 130 S. Ct. 546, 548 (2009) (per curiam); 
Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 855 n.4 (2006); Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 
828 (2002) (“‘[R]easonableness’ . . . is the touchstone of the constitutionality of a 
governmental search.”); United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118–19 (2001); Illinois v. 
McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 330 (2001) (stating that the Fourth Amendment’s “central 
requirement is one of reasonableness”) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); 
Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652–53 (1995) (“[T]he ultimate measure of 
the constitutionality of a governmental search is ‘reasonableness.’”). 
 295. Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 313 (1997). 
 296. Ric Simmons, Ending the Zero-Sum Game: How To Increase the Productivity of the 
Fourth Amendment, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 549, 575 (2013); see also Covey, supra 
note 286, at 1300 (“[T]he proliferation of destructive technologies and the increasing ease of 
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constitutional role in determining what is reasonable in the context of the 
hypothetical. Ric Simmons believes that legislative interpretations of the Fourth 
Amendment’s reasonableness clause are arguably “superior to judicial 
determinations,” and “deference to legislators seems even more sensible in the 
context of antiterrorism searches.”297 At a minimum, as Fiss has stated, the 
“President and the Congress are coordinate branches of government . . . charged 
with the duty of giving concrete meaning to the Constitution.”298  
More than fifty years ago in Keith, the Supreme Court recognized Congress’s 
constitutional role to consider the policy and practical considerations that are 
present when the government seeks to use wiretaps to protect the nation from grave 
threats.299 Given the different consequences that can be reasonably anticipated from 
the use of different types of WMDs, it is clear that the legislative branch has a 
constitutional role to play in determining what is reasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment in the context of the hypothetical. The legislative branch should 
resolve the definitional issues highlighted by Parts II and III, and identify the 
specific showings that the executive branch should be required to make to the 
judicial branch. In this regard, the legislative branch should also determine the 
nature and extent of any deference that it believes the judicial branch should give to 
the executive branch with respect to these showings.300 Indeed, how the legislative 
branch would resolve these questions is likely to be quite different from how the 
judicial branch would resolve them. 
The failure of the legislative branch to debate all of the issues in a timely 
manner would be most unfortunate. Congressional inertia or indifference to these 
issues may leave the judicial branch without criteria to evaluate whether the 
                                                                                                                 
manufacturing them will continually increase the hazards of placing off-limits any physical 
locations to preventative surveillance efforts by the state.”). 
 297. Simmons, supra note 13, at 900. In 1978, the House Permanent Select Committee 
on Intelligence certainly agreed with this assessment as well. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-1283, pt. 
2, at 21–22 (1978) (“[T]he decision as to the standards governing when and how foreign 
intelligence electronic surveillance should be conducted is and should be a political decision, 
in the best sense of the term, because it involves the weighing of important public policy 
concerns—civil liberties and the national security.”). 
 298. Fiss, supra note 27, at 25; see also Richard C. Worf, The Case for Rational Basis 
Review of General Suspicionless Searches and Seizures, 23 TOURO L. REV. 93, 131–37 
(2007) (arguing that suspicionless searches are constitutional if they have been approved by 
a legislative body); id. at 197 (“Courts should trust the political process to approve the right 
balance when it comes to searches and seizures of groups of ordinary citizens.”). But see 
Stephen Schulhofer, Pleasant Surprises—and One Disappointment—in the Supreme Court’s 
Cell Phone Decision, JUST SECURITY (June 27, 2014, 10:45 AM), http://justsecurity.org
/12312/pleasant-surprises-disappointment-supreme-courts-cell-phone-decision/ (arguing that 
Fourth Amendment concerns “cannot be met by porous safeguards that mainstream voters 
may consider ‘reasonable’”). 
 299. United States v. U.S. Dist. Ct. (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 322–23 (1972). 
 300. Although the Supreme Court has suggested that the judicial branch could consider 
giving “heightened deference to the judgments of the political branches with respect to matters 
of national security,” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 696 (2001), and has noted that courts 
have been “reluctant to intrude upon the authority of the Executive in . . . national security 
affairs,” Dep’t of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 530 (1988), this does not mean that Congress 
should not debate the degree to which there should be deference to the executive branch. 
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threatened use of a particular type of WMD should qualify for this new doctrinal 
solution. Indeed, inaction by Congress may very well “put judges into the business 
of making exceptions to a standard rule that is not easily cabined and is at odds 
with their obligation to say what the law is.”301 
The role of the judicial branch would, by no means, be a “rubberstamp.”302 The 
Supreme Court made clear in Keith that federal judges have the ability to 
understand national security matters, as more than three decades of jurisprudence 
has confirmed.303 This point is important to emphasize: part of the solution 
proposed in this Article requires a “neutral and detached”304 magistrate to 
determine whether the executive branch has met well-defined standards that have 
been publicly debated and approved by the legislative branch, and then presented to 
the President for his approval.305 However, it is equally important to state that the 
pathway to the solution should not reflexively rely on the special needs cases, 
which are based on programmatic purposes that extend beyond the normal needs of 
law enforcement.306 Rather, the solution relies on the principle that consequence 
has a constitutional role to play in Fourth Amendment calculus in certain limited 
circumstances.307 
As discussed above, the path forward also requires the executive branch to 
submit specific minimization procedures to the judicial branch for approval. 
Approval by the judicial branch of procedures that particularize the specific 
communications that may be retained by the executive branch would be an 
effective privacy-enhancing mechanism to ensure that “nothing is left to the 
discretion of the officer executing the warrant,”308 a core Fourth Amendment 
principle. Whether additional restrictions are also appropriate, including restrictions 
on the government’s ability to use the fruits of the wiretap, is another critical 
question that needs to be answered by policymakers.309 This is particularly 
                                                                                                                 
 
 301. Fiss, supra note 27, at 29. Fiss would, however, “resist the temptation to allow an 
exception to the warrant requirement for so-called extraordinary crimes, regardless of how 
the exception is formulated.” Id. In addition to being concerned about the difficulty of 
identifying the criteria needed to implement any exception, Fiss “fear[s] that an exception to 
the warrant requirement for extraordinary crimes would be susceptible to great abuse.” Id. 
 302. See ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724, 733 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); see also 
Henry Schuster, Inside America’s Secret Court, CNN (Feb. 14, 2006, 6:41 AM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2006/US/02/13/schuster.column/ (quoting the Honorable Royce C. 
Lamberth, former Chief Judge of the FISA court, saying that “the court was not a 
rubberstamp for the government”). 
 303. See Keith, 407 U.S. at 320 (“We cannot accept the Government’s argument that 
internal security matters are too subtle and complex for judicial evaluation.”); see also 
KRIS & WILSON, supra note 164, § 3:6. 
 304. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
 305. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 7, cl. 2 (“Every Bill which shall have passed the House of 
Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be presented to the President 
of the United States; If he approve he shall sign it . . . .”). 
 306. See supra notes 85–93 and accompanying text. 
 307. See supra notes 104–52 and accompanying text. 
 308. E.g., Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927). 
 309. See generally Ricardo J. Bascuas, Fourth Amendment Lessons from the Highway 
and the Subway: A Principled Approach to Suspicionless Searches, 38 RUTGERS L.J. 719, 
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important because use restrictions with respect to serious criminal activity could 
very well deprive the government of evidence that could convict a murderer.310 On 
the other hand, determining the nature and extent of use restrictions may, in certain 
circumstances, be critical to a court’s conclusion that the government’s actions 
should be considered constitutionally reasonable. 
Congressional action that establishes clear definitions and sets meaningful 
standards would ensure that if the government’s actions were subsequently 
presented to the judicial branch for review, presidential authority would be “at its 
maximum,” rather than in a “zone of twilight” or “at its lowest ebb.”311 Inclusion of 
the legislative branch should also be viewed as an important constitutional value to 
be preserved by a nation founded on a system of checks and balances.312 Finally, 
the legislative branch must ensure that inflexible constraints are not placed on the 
executive branch, which would prevent it from responding to the often 
unpredictable nature of a terrorist threat.313  
The challenge for the legislative branch is, therefore, to create a flexible process 
that still maintains an important independent check by the judicial branch.314 As the 
Supreme Court has observed in another constitutional context, Congress should 
engage in a “genuine debate about how best to preserve constitutional values while 
protecting the Nation from terrorism.”315 Moreover, as Justice Jackson wisely 
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Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (“When the legislative and executive powers are 
united in the same person . . . there can be no liberty. . . .”) (quoting BARON DE 
MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 151 (Thomas Nugent trans., Hafner Publishing 1949)). 
 313. See supra note 160 and accompanying text; see also Keith, 407 U.S. at 312 (“[U]nless 
Government safeguards its own capacity to function and to preserve the security of its people, 
society itself could become so disordered that all rights and liberties would be endangered.”). 
 314. Keith, 407 U.S. at 317. 
 315. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 798 (2008) (Souter, J., concurring) (“The 
political branches, consistent with their independent obligations to interpret and uphold the 
Constitution, can engage in a genuine debate about how best to preserve constitutional 
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stated in his concurring opinion in the Steel Seizure case, “We may say that power 
to legislate for emergencies belongs in the hands of Congress, but only Congress 
itself can prevent power from slipping through its fingers.”316 
CONCLUSION 
The prevention of massive destruction or catastrophic loss of life should be 
viewed as a critical factor in assessing Fourth Amendment reasonableness. In the 
context of the hypothetical, it is simply unacceptable to conclude that there are no 
circumstances where a federal court could issue a wiretap order that would enable 
the government to locate a terrorist and prevent the use of a WMD. As other 
scholars have noted, “[T]raditional [Fourth Amendment] doctrine falls short in an 
age of threats unprecedented in their potential for harm.”317 However, the Fourth 
Amendment’s protective lens and the probability consequence matrix can provide a 
pathway toward a new doctrinal solution. While the matrix will not resolve all of 
the issues that are raised by the hypothetical, and while subjective judgments may 
be inherent when assessments of probability and consequence are made, the matrix 
can provide an analytical framework for assessing the role that consequence should 
play in a Fourth Amendment calculus. 
Fairly well-established minimization principles are an essential element of a 
new doctrinal solution to the hypothetical. Such a solution, however, will require 
members of the legislative branch—as the elected representatives of the people—to 
debate the issues fully and assert their constitutional role in determining what is 
reasonable when a terrorist threatens to use a WMD. The legislative branch must 
enact clear definitions and standards “calibrated to the risk”318 that prevent the 
executive branch from unnecessarily intruding upon individual privacy.319 In 
addition, by requiring the executive branch to submit narrowly tailored 
minimization procedures, the executive branch’s actions will be cabined by the 
specific exigency which justified the surveillance.320 Most importantly, the 
imposition of such procedures will ensure that the executive branch will be acting 
under the watchful eye of the judicial branch.321 Taken together, all of these actions 
will provide government officials with greater ex ante legal certainty in regard to 
the constitutionality of their preventative actions, as well as the flexibility they may 
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need to respond to dynamic and unpredictable circumstances. Thus, government 
lawyers will say yes when they should say yes, and no when they should say no.322 
Stated another way, and to paraphrase former Supreme Court Justice Potter 
Stewart’s observation about automobile searches, thoughtful and deliberative action 
by each branch of government is necessary lest the acronym WMD becomes a 
“talisman in whose presence the Fourth Amendment fades away and disappears.”323 
The nation should not have to make the “false choice”324 between security and 
liberty. Instead, all three branches should play a role325 in ensuring the enduring 
vitality of the Fourth Amendment in this “brave new world”326 where the terrorist 
use of a WMD could lead to massive destruction or catastrophic loss of life. 
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